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GLOBALIZING STANDARD OF PATENT 
PROTECTION IN WTO LAW AND POLICY OPTIONS 
FOR THE LDCS: THE CONTEXT OF BANGLADESH 
 
M. Monirul Azam* 
 
INTRODUCTION 
This Article analyzes the globalizing standard of patent protection as 
adopted under the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
Rights (TRIPS Agreement) of the World Trade Organization (WTO) and 
possible options for the Least Developed Countries (LDCs)1 such as Bangladesh 
against the experiences of Brazil, India, and South Africa with special reference 
to pharmaceutical patent issues. The developed member countries of the WTO 
negotiated mandatory protections for pharmaceutical products and processes in 
the TRIPS Agreement on the basis that such mandatory protections will provide 
the necessary incentives for continued pharmaceutical innovation. In contrast, 
the developing countries and LDCs argued that enacting patent laws that comply 
  
 * M. Monirul Azam, Ph.D, L.L.M. in IP, Department of Law, University of 
Chittagong, Bangladesh, World Trade Institute, University of Bern, Switzerland and 
Department of Law, Stockholm University, Sweden. The author would like to express 
deep gratitude to Professor Thomas Cottier (University of Bern) for valuable comments 
on the first draft of this Article and Professor Marianne Levin (Stockholm University) for 
comments on the revised draft. The author is also grateful to the reviewers and editors for 
their valuable comments in preparation of the final draft for publication. 
 1 “There are no WTO definitions of ‘developed’ or ‘developing’ countries.” Least-
developed Countries, Understanding the WTO: The Organization, WORLD TRADE 
ORGANIZATION, http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org7_e.htm (last 
visited Apr. 27, 2014). “The WTO recognizes as [LDCs] those countries which have been 
designated as such by the United Nations. There are currently 48 [LDCs] on the UN list, 
33 of which to date have become WTO members.” Id. According to the United Nations, 
LDCs are countries that exhibit the lowest indicators of socioeconomic development, 
with the lowest human development index (HDI) ratings of all countries in the world. A 
country is classified as an LDC if it meets three criteria based on low income (three-year 
average gross national income (GNI) per capita of less than $992, which must exceed 
$1,190 to leave the list), human resources weakness (based on indicators of nutrition, 
health, education and adult literacy) and economic vulnerability (based on instability of 
agricultural production, instability of exports of goods and services, economic importance 
of non-traditional activities, merchandise export concentration, handicap of economic 
smallness, and the percentage of population displaced by natural disasters). Id. However, 
countries “graduate” out of the LDC classification when indicators exceed these criteria. 
Id. See for details Criteria for Identification and Graduation of LDCs, UN-OHRLLS, 
http://unohrlls.org/about-ldcs/criteria-for-ldcs/ (last visited Apr. 27, 2014). 
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with the TRIPS Agreement may restrict production and supply of low-cost 
generic medicines by their local pharmaceutical industries or by the 
pharmaceutical industries in other developing countries, and hence could 
increase the price of pharmaceuticals to the point that pharmaceuticals may 
become inaccessible to their populations. Considering the costs and benefits of 
such a system, the implementation of the TRIPS Agreement will require a 
reorganization and restructuring of the intellectual property regime in the LDCs. 
Given the extent of the reorganization and the restructuring required, LDCs (of 
which Bangladesh is one) were granted an initial transition period until 
December, 31 2005,2 which was later extended to July 1, 2013 to implement a 
TRIPS-compliant intellectual property regime within their domestic 
jurisdictions.3 The extension was given after a request by the LDCs as a group, 
pursuant to Article 66.1 of the TRIPS Agreement. The group cited socio-
economic, administrative and financial constraints and the need to create a 
viable technological base as reasons to justify the extension request. However, 
the transition period did not prove to be long enough for LDCs to introduce 
pharmaceutical patent protection and to take adequate measures to ensure access 
  
 2 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 
1869 U.N.T.S. 299, 33 I.L.M. 1197, art. 65 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement], 
available at http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/27-trips.pdf (LDCs were given a 
ten-year period (until 2005) in which to become TRIPS-compliant.). 
 3 The initial transition period for LDCs ended on December 31, 2005. Later, by a 
decision of the TRIPS Council on Tuesday, November 29, 2005, LDC members as a 
group were granted an extension of the transitional period for 7.5 years to apply the 
provisions of the TRIPS Agreement; that is, “until 1 July 2013, or until such a date on 
which they cease to be a least-developed country Member, whichever date is earlier.” 
WTO COUNCIL FOR TRIPS, EXTENSION OF THE TRANSITION PERIOD UNDER ARTICLE 66.1 
FOR LEAST-DEVELOPED COUNTRY MEMBERS (IP/C/40) ¶ 1 (Nov. 30, 2005), available at 
https://docs.wto.org/dol2fe/Pages/FE_Search/FE_S_S001.aspx (search for Document 
Number 05-5671). The TRIPS Council took the decision following the request by the 
LDCs as a group, pursuant to Article 66.1 of the TRIPS Agreement, for a fifteen-year 
extension of the transition period in order for those LDCs to be able to apply the 
provisions of the Agreement. WTO COUNCIL FOR TRIPS, MINUTES OF MEETING HELD IN 
THE CENTRE WILLIAM RAPPARD ON 25-26 AND 28 OCTOBER, 29 NOVEMBER AND 6 
DECEMBER 2005 (IP/C/M/49) ¶ 243 (Jan. 31, 2006), available at 
https://docs.wto.org/dol2fe/Pages/FE_Search/FE_S_S001.aspx (search for Document 
Number 06-0444). The group had cited socioeconomic, administrative and financial 
constraints and the need to create a viable technological base as reasons duly motivating 
the request. Id. at ¶ 245. The Decision was negotiated between LDCs and some key 
developed countries during informal consultations and was adopted by the formal TRIPS 
Council meeting on November 29, 2005. Id. at ¶¶ 276, 285. However, during the 
consultations, several developed country members, particularly the United States, insisted 
that each LDC member should request an extension on an individual basis and that 
extensions would be granted on a case-by-case basis. Id. at ¶¶ 267–68. 
 




to medicines; therefore, the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and 
Public Health was adopted by the WTO Ministerial Conference of 2001 in Doha 
on November 14, 2001, which further extended the transitional period for LDCs 
to introduce pharmaceutical patent protection to January 1, 2016.4 However, 
WTO members agreed on June 11, 2013 to further extend the deadline for LDCs 
until July 1, 2021 to protect IP under the TRIPS Agreement.5 It is vital for the 
LDCs to utilize the transitional periods properly to update their patent law 
regimes and other supporting governmental policy options so that after the 
expiration of the transitional period, LDCs are able to balance pharmaceutical 
innovation and access to medicines. 
During the TRIPS negotiations, it was argued that the principle of a 
balance of rights and obligations is required because IP owners need to 
undertake certain obligations in return for the exclusive rights conferred on them 
and also to allow governments to take remedial measures in the case of non-
fulfilment of these obligations so that IPRs can promote industrial creativity to 
benefit society in general.6 This principle was generally recognized in pre-
existing IP conventions and in national laws of many countries.7 “The 
acceptance of this principle was aimed at assuring the access of developing 
countries to modern technology, eliminating non-use, misuse or abusive use of 
  
 4 As per the Decision of the TRIPS Council to implement paragraph 7 of the Doha 
Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, LDCs shall be free to disregard 
the TRIPS disciplines on patents and undisclosed information with respect to 
pharmaceutical products, until 2016. See WTO, Ministerial Declaration of 14 November 
2001, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1, 41 I.L.M. 746 (2002) [hereinafter Doha Declaration], 
available at http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min01_e/ 
mindecl_trips_e.htm; WTO COUNCIL FOR TRIPS, EXTENSION OF THE TRANSITION PERIOD 
UNDER ARTICLE 66.1 OF THE TRIPS AGREEMENT FOR LEAST-DEVELOPED COUNTRY 
MEMBERS FOR CERTAIN OBLIGATIONS WITH RESPECT TO PHARMACEUTICAL PRODUCTS 
(IP/C/25) (June 1, 2002), WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/art66_1_e.htm. 
 5 However, this decision will not prejudice the extension of pharmaceutical patents 
granted under the Doha waiver, and LDCs can seek further extensions of that period. See 
WTO COUNCIL FOR TRIPS, EXTENSION OF THE TRANSITION PERIOD UNDER ARTICLE 66.1 
FOR LEAST DEVELOPED COUNTRY MEMBERS (IP/C/64) (June 12, 2013), available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/ta_docs_e/7_1_ipc64_e.pdf. 
 6 Negotiating Group on TRIPs, Including Trade in Counterfeit Goods, Meeting of 
Negotiating Group of 11-13 September 1989, GATT Doc. MTN.GNG/NG11/15 ¶ 20 





 7 See MICHAEL BLAKENEY, TRADE RELATED ASPECTS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
RIGHTS: A CONCISE GUIDE TO THE TRIPS AGREEMENT (INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN 
PRACTICE) (1998). 
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intellectual property rights, especially with a view to avoiding trade distortions, 
and allowing the flexibility in the intellectual property protection for the public 
interest and the developmental and technological needs of developing countries” 
and LDCs.8 
Therefore, the principle of balance of rights and obligations could be used 
while also using other flexibilities of the TRIPS Agreement. It was further 
suggested that the TRIPS Agreement should take into account the application of 
the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT) principle of securing a 
balance of rights and obligations among parties.9 However, as in the case of the 
principle of public interest, the application of the principle of balance of rights 
and obligations was adopted with the lock of the consistency test. As worded in 
TRIPS Article 8.2, any measure taken under the umbrella of this article must be 
“consistent with” the provisions of the TRIPS Agreement.10 Moreover, to what 
extent a practice is regarded as “unreasonably” restraining trade or “adversely” 
affecting the international transfer of technology, and to what extent a national 
response against such practices is regarded as an appropriate measure are 
ambiguous questions under this article. These unclear conditions leave room for 
interpretation but, otherwise, give rise to the difficulty in applying the principle 
of balance of rights and obligations. Considering the room for interpretation of 
TRIPS flexibilities and practices for countries like India, Brazil and South 
Africa, this Article explores possible options for Bangladesh while it complies 
with the patent provisions under the TRIPS Agreement. 
  
 8 Pham Hong Quat, How to Comply with the TRIPS and WTO Law: The New 
Challenges to Vietnam’s Patent Legislation from WTO Dispute Settlement Practice 42 






 9 See Negotiating Group on TRIPs, Including Trade in Counterfeit Goods, Meeting 
of Negotiating Group of 10–21 September 1990, MTN.GNG.NG11/25 ¶ 8, available at 
http://www.wto.org/gatt_docs/English/SULPDF/92110158.pdf. 
 10 TRIPS Agreement, supra note 2, art. 8.2. 
 




Brazil, India, and South Africa used TRIPS flexibilities in different ways 
to change their national patent regimes to become TRIPS compliant,11 but they 
experienced some difficulties with respect to the legislative measures they 
enacted.12 However, the legislative provisions were found to be within the scope 
of the flexibilities of the TRIPS Agreement. Bangladesh, as an LDC, faces 
public health challenges including lack of access to medicine due to high cost 
and in some instances inadequate supply, but Bangladesh has the potential to 
become a substantial (global) producer of generic medicines. The need to 
balance these competing interests (pharmaceutical innovation and access to 
pharmaceuticals) highlights that there may be good grounds for Bangladesh to 
  
 11 For example, Brazil implemented a system of compulsory licensing. See Kenneth 
C. Shadlen, The Politics of Patents and Drugs in Brazil and Mexico: The Industrial Bases 
of Health Activism 42 J. COMP. POL., Oct. 2009, at 41. Conversely, India’s experience 
was very different. India entered the WTO in 1995 and went through a long amendment 
process to institute a TRIPS-compliant patent regime, which became effective on January 
1, 2005. Prabhu Ram, India’s New “TRIPs-Compliant” Patent Regime: Between Drug 
Patents and the Right to Health, 5 CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 195, 195 (2006). The 
impact of stronger intellectual patent rights created problems for the larger Indian drug 
firms and greatly damaged the ability of smaller local firms to meet the rising costs of 
royalties and remuneration of experienced and efficient pharmacists and other technical 
people. See Stephen Barnes, Note, Pharmaceutical Patents and TRIPS: A Comparison of 
India and South Africa, 91 KY. L.J. 911, 924–25 (2003). 
 12 For example, the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) of the WTO set a panel, as 
requested by the United States, to go into the complaint about the patent laws of Brazil in 
2001, which the United States said illegally required the local working of patents and 
enabled compulsory licensing of the patent or the authorization of imports of the patented 
product (parallel imports) without the authorization of the patent holder. See Brazil – 
Measures Affecting Patent Protection, Dispute Settlement: Dispute DS199, WORLD 
TRADE ORGANIZATION, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/ 
cases_e/ds199_e.htm (last visited Apr. 27, 2014). However, due to huge public pressure 
and campaigns by public-health groups, both parties negotiated it outside the DSB. See 
id. Conversely, Indian patent law was challenged even in the Indian Court by an MNPC, 
Novartis, claiming that it was inconsistent with some of the provisions of the TRIPS 
Agreement. Rajshree Chandra, The Role of National Laws in Reconciling Constitutional 
Right to Health with TRIPS Obligations: An Examination of the Glivec Patent Casein 
India, in INCENTIVES FOR GLOBAL PUBLIC HEALTH-PATENT LAW AND ACCESS TO 
ESSENTIAL MEDICINES 392–94 (Thomas Pogge, Matthew Rimmer, & Kim Rubenstein 
eds., 2010). Another major concern is the confiscation of generic Indian medicines used 
to treat illnesses such as AIDS and hypertension in several European countries, regarding 
which India and Brazil complained to the WTO saying that the European Union had 
wrongfully confiscated generic medicines. See Jennifer M. Freedman, India, Brazil 
Complain at WTO Over EU Drug Seizures, BUSINESS WEEK (May 12, 2010), 
http://web.archive.org/web/20100515054911/http://www.businessweek.com/news/2010-
05-12/india-brazil-complain-at-wto-over-eu-drug-seizures-update3-.html (accessed by 
searching http://www.businessweek.com/news/2010-05-12/india-brazil-complain-at-wto-
over-eu-drug-seizures-update3-.html in the Internet Archive index).  
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use the Indian, Brazilian, and South African experiences as a way to guide 
Bangladesh’s legislative transition to a TRIPS-compliant patent regime. It is 
crucial for Bangladesh to use the experiences of Brazil, India, and South Africa 
to develop IPR policies that preserve the full complement of TRIPS flexibilities. 
In this regard, a comment by Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss is worth noting: “These 
practices [of India, Brazil, South Africa, and other developing countries] achieve 
international recognition as they are defended in international courts and put on 
the agendas of international organizations.”13 Therefore, “domestic actors then 
may interpret the law in a particular way that allows them to offer a new 
approach that others may choose to emulate.”14 While evaluating the possible 
policy options for LDCs such as Bangladesh to balance pharmaceutical 
innovation and access to medicines against the experiences of Brazil, India, and 
South Africa for complying with the TRIPS-compliant patent law, relevant 
discussions, policies, and recommendations as formulated in the WHO have also 
been indicated. 
This Article explores possible legislative and governmental intervention 
options for Bangladesh utilizing the experiences of Brazil, India, and to some 
extent, South Africa. It also reflects on the relevant policy issues and 
recommendations from the WHO. This Article uses legal doctrinal analysis, 
comparative review, and field research in Bangladesh using surveys and 
interviews to understand the perceptions of different stakeholders regarding 
different policy options available under the TRIPS Agreement.15 The field 
research in Bangladesh analyzed in-depth the situation at the Department of 
Patents, Designs and Trade Marks (DPDT)16 and the Directorate General of 
  
 13 Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, The Role of India, China, Brazil and Other Emerging 
Economies in Establishing Access Norms for Intellectual Property and Intellectual 
Property Lawmaking 13 (Inst. for Int’l Law and Justice, Working Paper No. 09-53, 
2009), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1442785. 
 14 Susan K. Sell, TRIPS Was Never Enough: Vertical Forum Shifting, FTAS, ACTA, 
and TPP, 18 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 447, 476 (2011). 
 15 To encourage participation, the survey and interview participants were promised 
anonymity. The author has provided as much information regarding the interview and 
survey participants as possible. If you would like more information on the results of the 
field study, please contact the author. 
 16 The present legislative regime relating to the patent and pharmaceutical industry in 
Bangladesh comprises the Drugs Act 1940, the Patents and Designs Act 1911 and the 
Patent and Design Rules 1933. In 2003, amendments were made to the Patents and 
Designs Act 1911 to establish the Department of Patents, Designs and Trade Marks 
(DPDT). DEPARTMENT OF PATENTS, DESIGNS AND TRADEMARKS (DPDT), 
http://www.dpdt.gov.bd/index.html (last visited Apr. 27, 2014). The DPDT is controlled 
by the Ministry of Industries and has jurisdiction to issue patents and designs. Id. The 
current patent law in Bangladesh with respect to patents is largely the same as it was in 
India, prior to changes in 1970. 
 




Drug Administration17 (DDA or DGDA)18 to understand the ongoing role of the 
two important regulatory bodies during the TRIPS waiver periods and to 
understand their possible role in a post-TRIPS setting. 
I. LEGISLATIVE OPTIONS FOR BANGLADESH 
Using the Brazilian, Indian, and South African experiences, a number of 
legislative options should be considered by Bangladesh in order to introduce 
TRIPS-compliant patent law to help preserve Bangladesh’s local pharmaceutical 
industry and to promote innovation and access to medicine. For the purposes of 
this Article, the legislative options include (i) having a high threshold for 
patentability and exclusion from patentability provisions, (ii) having a best mode 
patent disclosure and disclosure of origin, (iv) narrowing the scope of patent 
claims, (iv) providing exceptions to product patent rights such as early working, 
parallel imports, and research and experimental-use exceptions, (v) having a 
strong compulsory licensing mechanism, (vi) having prior-use exceptions, (vii) 
having pre-grant and post-grant oppositions (viii) making the duration of patent 
protection subject to exceptions, and (ix) not adopting overprotective 
enforcement provisions. Each of these options will be examined in turn. 
A. High Threshold and Exclusion Clause 
Under the TRIPS Agreement, patent protection must be granted for 
products and processes which are new, involve an inventive step, and are 
industrially applicable.19 The definition of an invention itself constitutes a key 
aspect of any patent policy with implications in other areas, such as industrial 
  
 17 The Directorate of Drug Administration (DDA) was the national regulatory 
authority in Bangladesh, which was established back in 1976 under Ministry of Health 
and Family Welfare and empowered to regulate “Bangladesh’s 838 manufacturers of 
allopathic, unani, ayurvedic, herbal, homeopathic, and biochemic manufacturers’ 
products.” JUDE NWOKIKE & HYE LYNN CHOI, ASSESSMENT OF THE REGULATORY 
SYSTEMS AND CAPACITY OF THE DIRECTORATE GENERAL FOR DRUG ADMINISTRATION IN 
BANGLADESH viii (Nov. 2012). The DDA was upgraded in January 2010 to the 
Directorate General of Drug Administration (DGDA). Id. at 8. It is responsible for the 
production, quality, registration, safety, efficacy, import, export, and distribution of 
pharmaceuticals based on the power delegated to it by the different pharmaceutical 
regulations. See id. 
 18 Although the DDA upgraded to DGDA in 2010, most of the government 
documents have yet to be replaced with the new name. Hence, this Article used DGDA 
and DDA interchangeably, which does not signify any major differences between the 
activities of former DDA and the new DGDA. 
 19 TRIPS Agreement, supra note 2, art. 27.1 (emphasis added) (providing that 
“patents shall be available for any inventions, whether products or processes, in all fields 
of technology, provided that they are new, involve an inventive step and are capable of 
industrial application”). 
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and public health policies. Therefore, with countries that are net importers of 
technologies, their priority should be to focus on narrowing the scope of 
patentability in addition to incorporating as many exceptions as possible under 
the national patent law in order to be able to develop and create a viable 
technological base. This also applies in the case of pharmaceutical products. 
The TRIPS Agreement did not define the criteria for patent protection; 
therefore, these criteria can be interpreted and applied by member states in 
accordance with their national priorities and developmental goals.20 For 
example, the TRIPS Agreement “does not specify the patenting of new uses of 
known products, including pharmaceutical drugs, thus allowing member 
countries the possibility of rejecting these new uses for lack of novelty, 
inventive step or industrial applicability.”21 
The TRIPS Agreement considers novelty to mean that the invention is not 
already part of an existing invention and represents an inventive step.22 
Considering the importance of having a high threshold for patentability in 
countries like Bangladesh, Tony VanDuzer stated: 
It is a common practice of patent owners in the pharmaceutical sector to 
seek to extend the effective duration of patent protection by obtaining a 
second later patent on a new mode of delivery of a patented drug (such as 
capsules instead of tablets) or some other small change in a patented 
product. Setting high standards for novelty and inventive step would help 
to ensure that a patent on a product was not, in effect, extended by a 
subsequent patent on a trivial improvement.23 
Justifying the non-granting of patent for new uses or second uses, Correa stated: 
  
 20 See Mohammed El Said, The Implementation Paradox: Intellectual Property 
Regulation in the Arab World, 9 J. INT’L TRADE L. & POL’Y 221, 228 (2010). 
 21 Id. at 229. 
 22 See id. Article 27.1 reads:  
Subject to the provisions of paragraphs 2 and 3, patents shall be available for 
any inventions, whether products or processes, in all fields of technology, pro-
vided that they are new, involve an inventive step and are capable of industrial 
application. Subject to paragraph 4 of Article 65, paragraph 8 of Article 70 and 
paragraph 3 of this Article, patents shall be available and patent rights enjoya-
ble without discrimination as to the place of invention, the field of technology 
and whether products are imported or locally produced. 
Id. (footnote omitted). 
 23 Tony VanDuzer, TRIPS and the Pharmaceutical Industry in Bangladesh: Towards 
a National Strategy 33–34 (CPD Occasional Paper Series, Paper 24, 2003) (footnote 
omitted), available at http://www.bdresearch.org/home/attachments/article/ 
nArt/TRIPS_and_the_Pharmaceutical_Industry_in_Bangladesh.pdf. See generally 
Rajnish Kumar Rai, Patentable Subject Matter Requirements: An Evaluation of Proposed 
Exclusions to India’s Patent Law in Light of India’s Obligations Under the TRIPS 
Agreement and Options for India, 8 CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 41 (2008). 
 




Such an invention relating to the use of a product may be deemed as non-
patentable because it consists of the discovery of an existing property 
rather than a new development, or because it falls under the exclusion 
from patentability (allowed by the [TRIPS] Agreement and most national 
laws) of therapeutical methods.24 
It is feared that awarding protection to new uses of medicines will stifle 
innovation and restrict the ability of pharmaceutical companies in the 
developing countries and the LDCs to produce advanced medications needed for 
eradicating local disease.25 This requirement could also block the introduction of 
generics, particularly in those countries where pharmacy laws do not permit 
generic substitution and/or generic prescribing.26 This will have anticompetitive 
consequences and result in higher prices of medications. 
In this regard, the Commission on Intellectual Property Rights, 
Innovation and Public Health (CIPIH) Report provides that: 
Governments should take action to avoid barriers to legitimate competition 
by considering developing guidelines for patent examiners on how 
properly to implement patentability criteria and, if appropriate, consider 
changes to national patent legislation.27 
Again, the U.K. IPRs stated that:  
Most developing countries, particularly those without researchcapabilities, 
should strictly exclude diagnostic, therapeutic andsurgical methods from 
patentability, including new uses of known products.28 
  
 24 CARLOS M. CORREA, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, THE WTO AND DEVELOPING 
COUNTRIES 56 (2000). 
 25 See CARLOS CORREA, GUIDELINES FOR THE EXAMINATION OF PHARMACEUTICAL 
PATENTS: DEVELOPING A PUBLIC HEALTH PERSPECTIVE – A WORKING PAPER iv–v 2006), 
available at http://ictsd.net/downloads/2008/04/correa_pharmaceutical-patents-
guidelines.pdf. 
 26 See id. at 1. 
 27 WORLD HEALTH ORG., PUBLIC HEALTH, INNOVATION, AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
RIGHTS: REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, INNOVATION 





 28 COMMISSION ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, INTEGRATING INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY RIGHTS AND DEVELOPMENT POLICY 50 (2002) [hereinafter INTEGRATING 
REPORT], available at http://www.iprcommission.org/papers/pdfs/ 
final_report/CIPRfullfinal.pdf. Clare Short, the then British Secretary of State for 
International Development, established the Commission on Intellectual Property Rights 
in May 2001. Id. at i. 
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On one hand, “there is no agreed international standard of absolute novelty, and, 
within limits, the developing countries may pick and choose from among the 
different approaches recognized in the domestic patent laws.”29 However, the 
manner of dealing with the issue of the scope of patentability differs from one 
country to another because this issue heavily relies on each country’s level of 
progress, development, and technological capability. 
Furthermore, in addition to the flexibility awarded in drafting the 
patentability criteria, the TRIPS Agreement also provides for a number of 
exemptions which may be excluded from patentability. Article 27.2 of TRIPS 
states: 
Members may exclude from patentability inventions, the prevention within 
their territory of the commercial exploitation of which is necessary to 
protect ordre public or morality, including to protect human, animal or 
plant life or health orto avoid serious prejudice to the environment, 
provided thatsuch exclusion is not made merely because the exploitation is 
prohibited by their law.30 
The fact that the TRIPS Agreement does not define protect ordre public and 
morality gives member states additional room for flexibility. 
The existing patent law of Bangladesh, the Patents and Designs Act 1911 
(PDA), contains no legislative provision regarding the patentability of a 
pharmaceutical product and contains no provision detailing excluded categories 
of inventions. By defining thresholds for novelty so as to impose a significant 
requirement for novelty, Bangladesh could ensure that trivial improvements in 
technology would not receive patent protection. India adopted such an approach 
when it amended its Patent Act in 2005.31 The Indian Patent Act now restricts 
the scope for granting patents based on frivolous claims.32 The Indian Patent Act 
2005 clarifies that an “inventive step” means a feature of an invention that 
“involves technical advances as compared to the existing knowledge or having 
economic significance or both.”33 It also provides a definition for 
“pharmaceutical substance” as being “a new entity involving one or more 
inventive steps.”34 Further, the Indian Patent Act 2005 provides that “the mere 
discovery of a new form of a known substance which does not result in the 
enhancement of the known efficacy” is not patentable.35 
  
 29 J.H. Reichman, From Free Riders to Fair Followers: Global Competition Under 
the TRIPS Agreement, 29 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 11, 30 (1997). 
 30 TRIPS Agreement, supra note 2, art. 27.2. 
 31 See Reichman, supra note 29, at 93 n.62. 
 32 K. Gopakumar, Product Patents and Access to Medicines in India: A Critical 
Review of the Implementation of TRIPS Patent Regime, 3 LAW & DEV. REV. 326, 334 
n.31 (2010). 
 33 The Patents Act, 1970, § 2(ja), No. 39, Acts of Parliament, 1970 (India). 
 34 Id. at § 2(ta). 
 35 Id. at § 3(d). 
 




In an attempt to ensure access to medicine, section 3(b) of the Indian 
Patent Act 2005 excludes from patentability “an invention the primary or 
intended use or commercial exploitation of which could be contrary to public 
order or morality or which causes serious prejudice to human, animal or plant 
life or health or to the environment.”36 Section 3(p) also excludes patenting of 
“an invention which, in effect, is traditional knowledge or which is an 
aggregation or duplication of known properties of traditionally known 
component or components.”37 This provision is an attempt to avoid bio-piracy 
and ensure that traditional knowledge, whether handed down or developed, is 
incapable of being captured by patents. One interview participant commented 
that Section 3 of the Indian Patent Act 2005 is a powerful instrument to prevent 
frivolous patents and the abuse of traditional knowledge and resources in India.38 
Given the absence of patentability and exclusion clauses in the existing 
patent law of Bangladesh, such legislative provisions should be considered by 
Bangladesh as it moves toward TRIPS compliance. Such legislative provisions 
are in compliance with the TRIPS Agreement, and are justified on the basis that 
limiting the availability of patents should promote competition in the local 
market.39 However, in the 2010 Draft Patents and Designs Act of Bangladesh 
(Draft PDA)40 there are provisions on patentable inventions41 and exclusion from 
patentability.42 Unlike the Indian patent law provisions, these provisions failed 
to utilize the high threshold of patentability options effectively because they lack 
a provision covering pharmaceutical substances, an exclusion clause pertaining 
  
 36 The Patents (Amendment) Act, 2005, § 3(b), No. 15, Acts of Parliament, 2005 
(India). 
 37 Id. at § 3(p). 
 38 Email interview with a patent law academic in Delhi, India (Mar. 10, 2012). 
 39 See generally Mohammad M. Azam & Kristy Richardson, Trips Compliant Patent 
Law and the Pharmaceutical Industry in Bangladesh: Challenges and Opportunities, 
LAWASIA J. 141 (2010). 
 40 In 2001, a draft patent law was prepared by the Law Commission of Bangladesh in 
consultation with WIPO. It was not considered until 2007. Meanwhile, transitional 
periods for the introduction of TRIPS-compliant intellectual property law including 
patent law was extended for LDCs until July 2013, and the obligation to introduce 
pharmaceutical patents was extended until January 1, 2016 for LDCs. Developing 
Countries’ Transition Periods, FACT SHEET: TRIPS and Pharmaceutical Patents, 
WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/ 
factsheet_pharm04_e.htm (last visited Apr. 27, 2014). This Draft was reviewed lightly in 
2007, and it was under consideration by the Ministry of Law and Parliamentary Affairs of 
Bangladesh as the Draft Patents and Designs Act, 2010. It is translated by the Law 
Commission and Ministry of Law into national language “Bangla” with little revision and 
adopted a separate draft Act in “Bangla” for patents only as Bangladesh Patent Ain, 2012 
(Bangladesh Patent Act, 2012). Unless this Draft is approved by the Parliament of 
Bangladesh, the existing Patents and Designs Act, 1911 will remain in force. 
 41 Draft Patents and Designs Act, 2010 § 3, 2010 (Bangl.). 
 42 Id. at § 4. 
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to mere improvement, and protection from abuse of traditional knowledge. The 
Draft PDA tried to extend the ambit of prior art under the definition of novelty: 
(2) Prior art in the case of an invention shall be taken to comprise- 
 
(a) all matter, whether a product, a process, information about either, or 
anything else, made available to the public anywhere in the world, by 
written or oral description, by use or in any other way, at any time prior to 
the filing or, as the case may be, the priority date, of the application for 
patent claiming the invention.43 
However, this provision may not be effective without a specific exclusion 
clause; therefore, these provisions should be revised in light of the Indian Patent 
Act 2005.  
Local pharmaceutical companies in Bangladesh view this provision as 
very important for generic producers and consumers because it will increase 
competition in the local market.44 However, multinational pharmaceutical 
companies (MNPCs) argue that a high threshold for patentability will exclude 
local inventions from patentability, which would not benefit society.45 The 
middle ground would suggest that such a provision will balance the need to 
maintain and support innovation with the need for access to pharmaceuticals. 
B. Best Mode Disclosure and Disclosure of the Source of Genetic Resources and 
Traditional Knowledge 
Because the aim of the patent regime is the disclosure of information and 
spread of knowledge, a “[l]ack of sufficient disclosure may be a reason for 
refusal result in the rejection of an application or invalidation of a patent.”46 
Correa stresses that “[t]his requirement has particular importance in the 
chemical and pharmaceutical fields to enable the reproduction of the invention 
during the patent term (for instance, in the case of a compulsory license) or after 
patent’s expiry.”47 
Article 29 of the TRIPS Agreement requires that an applicant for a patent 
disclose the invention “in a manner sufficiently clear and complete for the 
invention to be carried out by a person skilled in the art.”48 This “may also 
require the applicant to indicate the best mode for carrying out the invention 
known to the inventor at the filing date.”49 
  
 43 Id. at § 5(2). 
 44 Based on the survey data, this position has been supported by the majority of large, 
medium, and small local pharmaceutical companies in Bangladesh. 
 45 This has been remarked by a CEO of an MNPC operating in Bangladesh. 
 46 Correa, supra note 26, at 4. 
 47 Id. 
 48 TRIPS Agreement, supra note 2, art. 29. 
 49 Id. 
 




The absence of high disclosure requirements will have long-term negative 
implications upon innovation, technology transfer, and the dissemination of 
technology in the pharmaceutical sector in developing countries.50 It will likely 
strengthen the monopolistic position of MNPCs by preventing local 
pharmaceutical companies from benefiting from the disclosed technical 
information and precluding efforts in research and development (R&D) based on 
that information.51 
Section 4(2) of the PDA in Bangladesh simply provides that “a complete 
specification must particularly describe and ascertain the nature of the invention 
and the manner in which the same is to be performed.”52 Bangladesh should take 
advantage of Article 29 of the TRIPS Agreement by requiring disclosure of the 
best known mode for carrying out the invention and also that the disclosure 
enable the execution of all embodiments of the invention. 
During an interview, one participant argued that, given the weakness of 
the existing provisions, patent applications in Bangladesh are typically 
ambiguous. Often it is difficult to ascertain a precise description of the 
invention, which ultimately frustrates the objective of granting of a patent in 
exchange for sufficiently disclosing the invention to contribute to technical 
learning and teaching.53 One participant argued that the ultimate benefit of 
disclosure of an invention is the further development of that particular invention, 
which leads to increased competition in the marketplace; therefore, after the 
expiry of the patent term, competitors can enter the market with more viable 
options.54 
Both India and Brazil have adopted the best mode disclosure approach. 
Section II, Article 24 of the Brazilian Industrial Property Law provides that the 
“specifications shall clearly and sufficiently describe the object, so as to permit 
its reproduction by a technician versed in the subject, and shall indicate, when 
  
 50 Id. 
 51 See generally Bingbin Lu, Best Mode Disclosure for Patent Applications: An 
International and Comparative Perspective, 16 J. INTELL. PROP. RTS. 409 (2011), 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Delivery.cfm/SSRN_ID1938859_ 
code381567.pdf?abstractid=1938859&mirid=1. 
 52 Patents and Designs Act, 1911, § 4, effective Mar. 26, 1971 by virtue of the Laws 
Continuation and Enforcement Order of March 25, 1971, and adaptation of Existing 
Bangladesh Law Order of 1972. The Patents and Designs Act, 1911 is the same as Indian 
Patents and Designs Act, 1911 (No. II of 1911 (10 Pat. & T.M. Rev. 3697)). 
 53 Interview with a pharmacist working in a leading local pharmaceutical company in 
Bangladesh, in Dhaka, Bangl. (Mar. 3, 2009). 
 54 Interview with an examiner at the DPDT, in Dhaka, Bangl. (Mar. 1, 2009). 
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applicable, the best way of doing it.”55 On the other hand, section 10(4) of the 
Indian Patent Law in 1970 provides that every complete specification shall: 
a. fully and particularly describe the invention and its operation or use 
and the method by which it is to be performed;  
b. disclose the best method of performing the invention which is known 
to the applicant and for which he is entitled to claim protection.56 
Therefore, Bangladesh should adopt a similar requirement to facilitate 
innovation and the development of competing products. It is worth noting that 
section 11 of the Draft PDA of Bangladesh included a provision which, in part, 
requires that: 
(4) Every complete specification- 
 
(a) shall fully and particularly describe the invention and the method by 
which it is to be performed; 
(b) shall disclose the best method of performing the invention which is 
known to the applicant and for which he is entitled to claim 
protection.57 
Adoption of this provision would help the DPDT of Bangladesh to reject patent 
applications if the inventions are not sufficiently disclosed.  
However, best mode disclosure does not necessarily require disclosure of 
origin, and hence may not prevent abuse of genetic resources and traditional. 
This led to a number of developing countries including by Brazil and India58 to 
debate in the WTO the question of “whether and how patent applicants should 
be obliged to disclose the origin or source of the genetic resource and traditional 
knowledge used in an invention and provide evidence of prior informed consent 
and benefit sharing.”59 Because TRIPS Article 29 does not specifically required 
disclosure of origin, developing countries are requesting amendments to the 
  
 55 Lei No. 9.279 art. 24, de 14 de maio de 1996, Diario Oficial Da Uniao [D.O.U.] de 
15.05.1996. (Braz.), translated in Brazil: Industrial Property Law, 14/05/1996, No. 9.279, 
http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/details.jsp?id=515 (last visited Mar. 24, 2014). 
 56 The Patents Act, 1970, § 10(4), No. 39, Acts of Parliament, 1970 (India), available 
at http://ipindia.nic.in/ipr/patent/patent_2005.pdf. 
 57 Draft Patents and Designs Act, 2010 § 11, 2010 (Bangl.). 
 58 See WTO COUNCIL FOR TRIPS, ELEMENTS OF THE OBLIGATION TO DISCLOSE THE 
SOURCE AND COUNTRY OF ORIGIN OF BIOLOGICAL RESOURCE AND/OR TRADITIONAL 
KNOWLEDGE USED IN AN INVENTION (IP/C/W/429) 2 (Sept. 21, 2004), available at 
http://docsonline.wto.org/imrd/directdoc.asp?DDFDocuments/t/IP/C/W429.doc. 
 59 See WTO PUBLIC SYMPOSIUM, DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS: INCORPORATING THE 
CBD PRINCIPLES IN THE TRIPS AGREEMENT ON THE ROAD TO HONG KONG ¶ 1 (Apr. 21, 
2005), available at http://ictsd.org/downloads/2008/12/meeting-report.pdf. 
 




TRIPS Agreement to ensure that the necessary requirements are incorporated 
into patent application procedures.60 
On the other hand, Switzerland also made proposals relating to disclosure 
of origin to the WTO/TRIPS Council,61 to the WIPO Working Group on Reform 
of the Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT),62 and to the WIPO Intergovernmental 
Committee on Intellectual Property and Genetic Resources, Traditional 
Knowledge and Folklore (IGC).63 In Switzerland’s opinion, “the provisions of 
the TRIPS Agreement provide for adequate flexibility with regard to a formal 
requirement to disclose the source. Accordingly, Switzerland does not consider 
it necessary to amend the TRIPS Agreement.”64 Consequently, it can be said that 
TRIPS Article 29 does not prevent the introduction of the requirement to 
  
 60 Tove Iren S. Gerhardsen, Developing Countries Propose TRIPS Amendment on 
Disclosure, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY WATCH (June 1, 2006, 1:44 PM), http://www.ip-
watch.org/2006/06/01/developing-countries-propose-trips-amendment-on-disclosure/. 
 61 See WTO COUNCIL FOR TRIPS, ARTICLE 27.3(B), THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE 
TRIPS AGREEMENT AND THE CBD, AND THE PROTECTION OF TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE 
(IP/C/W/400/Rev.1) (June 18, 2003), available at 
http://docsonline.wto.org/imrd/directdoc.asp?DDFDocuments/t/IP/C/W400R1.doc; see 
also WTO COUNCIL FOR TRIPS, FURTHER OBSERVATIONS BY SWITZERLAND ON ITS 
PROPOSALS REGARDING THE DECLARATION OF THE SOURCE OF GENETIC RESOURCES AND 
TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE IN PATENT APPLICATIONS (IP/C/W/433) (Nov. 25, 2004), 
available at http://docsonline.wto.org/imrd/directdoc.asp?DDF 
Documents/t/IP/C/W433.doc. 
 62 WORKING GROUP ON REFORM OF THE PATENT COOPERATION TREATY (PCT), WIPO, 
INTERNATIONAL PATENT COOPERATION UNION, PROPOSALS BY SWITZERLAND REGARDING 
THE DECLARATION OF THE SOURCE OF GENETIC RESOURCES AND TRADITIONAL 
KNOWLEDGE IN PATENT APPLICATIONS (PCT/R/WG/4/13) (May 5, 2003) available at 
www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/pct/en/pct_r_wg_4/pct_r_wg_4_13.pdf; WORKING GROUP ON 
REFORM OF THE PATENT COOPERATION TREATY (PCT), WIPO, INTERNATIONAL PATENT 
COOPERATION UNION, PROPOSALS BY SWITZERLAND REGARDING THE DECLARATION OF 
THE SOURCE OF GENETIC RESOURCES AND TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE IN PATENT 
APPLICATIONS (Doc PCT/R/WG/5/11 Rev.) (Nov. 19, 2003), available at 
http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/pct/en/pct_r_wg_5/pct_r_wg_5_11_rev.pdf. 
 63 See WIPO INTERGOVERNMENTAL COMMITTEE ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, AND 
GENETIC RESOURCES, TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE, AND FOLKLORE, FURTHER 
OBSERVATIONS BY SWITZERLAND ON ITS PROPOSALS REGARDING THE DECLARATION OF 
THE SOURCE OF GENETIC RESOURCES AND TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE IN PATENT 
APPLICATIONS (WIPO/GRTKF/IC/7/INF/5) (Oct. 18, 2004), available at 
http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/tk/en/wipo_grtkf_ic_7/wipo_grtkf_ic_7_inf_5.pdf. 
 64 Felix Addor, WTO Public Symposium, ICTSD/CIEL/IDDRI/IUCN/QUNO 
Dialogue on Disclosure Requirements: Incorporating the CBD Principles in the TRIPS 
Agreement on the Road to Hong Kong: Switzerland’s Proposals Regarding the 
Declaration of the Source of Genetic Resources and Traditional Knowledge in Patent 
Applications and Switzerland’s Views on the Declaration of Evidence of Prior Informed 
Consent and Benefit Sharing in Patent Applications 5 (Apr. 21, 2005), available at 
http://www.iprsonline.org/ictsd/docs/DOO6_Addor.pdf. 
Globalizing Standard of Patent Protection in WTO Law and Policy 





disclose the source within the national legislation.65 In the context of Bangladesh 
during field studies, one participant argued that “in the absence of qualified and 
experienced examiners, best mode disclosure and disclosure of origin provisions 
would have little effect.”66 
However, in Bangladesh, neither the existing PDA nor the Draft PDA of 
2010 includes any provision on the disclosure of origin. But the Draft Patent 
Law of 2012 states under section 15 that patents on genetic resources or 
traditional knowledge could be granted provided that the procedure of “relevant 
authority and related rules” is followed, and, before granting such patent, due 
consideration must be given to the issues of public order and morality.67 But, 
there is no explanation or indication in the draft law regarding “relevant 
authority and rules,” and also there is no existing authority or rules in 
Bangladesh that deal with the issues of genetic resources or traditional 
knowledge. Therefore, Bangladesh should amend the proposed law, preferably 
to include disclosure of origin as part of patent application requirement rather 
than in separate provision. 
In addition to high-level disclosure, limiting the scope of patent claims 
may also be useful for Bangladesh. 
C. Narrow the Scope of Patent Claims 
In a 2003 report, Tony VanDuzer stated: 
The broader the claims that an inventor can make under [a patent] law, the 
wider the monopoly the inventor can obtain. Broad claims reduce the 
scope for competing products in the market, whereas narrow claims create 
greater opportunities for innovation and competition. National laws vary in 
the nature and breadth of claims permitted. In relation to pharmaceutical 
products claims can be restricted to the chemical structure or composition 
of a new product. . . . The TRIPS Agreement is silent on the form of and 
limits on allowable claims and so Bangladesh would be free to adopt a 
patent law that requires that pharmaceutical patent claims be limited to the 
precise chemical composition of the product.68 
  
 65 “A number of countries . . . have already [incorporated] disclosure of origin 
requirements (in different forms and conditions) in their domestic legislation, including in 
the Andean Community (Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela), Brazil, Costa 
Rica, Denmark, India, Nepal, Norway and the African Union (53 African countries).” 
DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS: ENSURING MUTUAL SUPPORTIVENESS BETWEEN THE WTO 
TRIPS AGREEMENT AND THE CBD 9 (Martha Chouchena-Rojas et al. eds., 2005). 
 66 Interview with an IP lawyer working as a legal adviser and practitioner at the 
Supreme Court, in Dhaka, Bangl. (Dec. 27, 2009). 
 67 See Draft Patent Act, 2012 § 15, 2012 (Bangl.) (available only in Bangla), 
available at http://www.moind.gov.bd/index.php?option=com_docman 
&task=doc_download&gid=821&Itemid=236.  
 68 Tony VanDuzer, supra note 23, at 33. 
 




Section 4(3) of the PDA of Bangladesh provides that a specification, 
whether provisional or complete, must commence with the title, and in the case 
of a complete specification must end with a distinct statement of the invention 
claimed.69 Based upon this provision, the law is not able to facilitate the 
narrowing of coverage of pharmaceutical patents, but rather encourages 
applications for broad patents. By way of comparison, Brazilian legislation 
provides that “[t]he claims shall be substantiated in the specifications, 
characterizing the particulars of the application, and clearly and precisely 
defining the subject matter that is the object of the protection.”70 During an 
interview, one participant argued that most of the pharmaceutical patents 
granted in Bangladesh prior to suspension of pharmaceutical patents in 2008 
were based on broad claims, which in the future may restrict the production of 
generic pharmaceuticals.71 Therefore, Bangladesh should adopt provisions 
similar to Brazil’s that narrow the ability to claim a pharmaceutical patent so as 
to restrict patenting on broad claims. However, to encourage further 
development and innovation on any patented product, additional exceptions are 
necessary to facilitate generic competition and cheaper products for the 
consumers. Such exceptions include early working, a research and experimental 
use exception and parallel imports. 
D. Provide Exceptions to Product Patent Rights 
Patent rights are not absolute but rather are subject to certain limitations 
and exceptions. These limitations and exceptions are often designed to foster 
and promote technology transfer, to prevent the abuse of intellectual property, to 
foster research and innovation, and to protect public policy priorities including 
public health. 
Article 30 of the TRIPS Agreement permits member countries to “provide 
limited exceptions to the exclusive rights conferred by a patent.”72 This article 
does not list the specific acts for which exceptions can be provided. What it says 
is that such exceptions should satisfy certain conditions that do not 
“unreasonably conflict with a normal exploitation of the patent and do not 
unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the patent owner, taking 
account of the legitimate interests of third parties.”73 The TRIPS Agreement 
does not contain any explanation of the terms “limited exceptions,” 
“unreasonably conflict” or “legitimate interests” and “hence the use of this 
  
 69 The Patents and Designs Act, 1911 § 4(3), 1911 (Bangl.). 
 70 Lei No. 9.279 art. 25, de 14 de maio de 1996, Diario Oficial Da Uniao [D.O.U.] de 
15.05.1996. (Braz.), translated in Brazil: Industrial Property Law, 14/05/1996, No. 9.279, 
http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/details.jsp?id=515 (last visited Mar. 24, 2014). 
 71 Interview with a pharmaceutical researcher at the University of Dhaka, in Dhaka, 
Bangl. (Mar. 12, 2009). 
 72 TRIPS Agreement, supra note 2, art. 30. 
 73 Id. 
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provision depends on the interpretation of these conditions.”74 There are two 
exceptions used by India and Brazil in their legislative framework: (i) early 
working (Bolar exceptions) and research and experimental use and (ii) parallel 
importing. 
E. Early Working (or Bolar Exceptions) and Research and Experimental Use 
The early working exemption is commonly referred to as the “Bolar” 
provision or exception, as it derives from Roche Products, Inc. v. Bolar 
Pharmaceutical Co.,75 which concerned the manufacturing of generic 
pharmaceuticals. Bolar Pharmaceutical was the generic drug manufacturer and 
Roche Products was the pharmaceutical company that made and sold Valium, 
the active ingredient of which was patented.76 Before the patent expired, Bolar 
used the patented chemical in experiments to determine if its generic product 
was the bioequivalent to Valium, and, therefore, could obtain U.S. FDA 
approval for its generic version.77 Bolar argued that its use of the patented 
product was not an infringement based on the experimental use exception and 
that public policy favored the availability of generic drugs immediately 
following a patent’s expiration.78 
“The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit rejected Bolar’s contention 
holding that the experimental use exception did not apply because Bolar 
intended to sell its generic product in competition with Roche’s Valium after 
patent expiration and, therefore, Bolar’s experiments had a business purpose,” 
and did not qualify for the statutory exception.79 The Court recognized that any 
change to the patent law needed to be made by Congress.80 
Shortly after Bolar Pharmaceutical was decided, Congress passed a law 
permitting the use of patented products in experiments for the purpose of 
obtaining FDA approval.81 As a result of this change, exceptions for early 
  
 74 Mohammad Monirul Azam & Yacouba Sabere Mounkoro, Intellectual Property 
Protection for the Pharmaceuticals: An Economic and Legal Impacts Study with Special 
Reference to Bangladesh and Mali, LE GRIOT DU DEVELOPPEMENT § 7.1.2 (June 1, 2012), 
http://legriotdudeveloppement.blogspot.com/2012/06/intellectual-property-protection-
for.html. 
 75 Roche Prods., Inc. v. Bolar Pharm. Co., 733 F. 2d 858 (Fed. Cir. 2006); see Anshull 
Mittal, Patent Linkage in India: Current Scenario and Need for Deliberation, 15 J. 
INTELL. PROP. RTS. 187, 193 (2010). 
 76 Bolar Pharm., 733 F.2d at 861. 
 77 Id. at 861–62. 
 78 Id. at 862. 
 79 Mittal, supra note 75, at 193. 
 80 See id. 
 81 Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-
417, 98 Stat. 1585 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 68(b)–(c), 70(b) (1994); 21 
U.S.C. §§ 301, 355, 360cc (1994); 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (1994); 35 U.S.C. §§ 156, 271, 282 
(1994)). 
 




working gained momentum and now Bolar exceptions have been enacted in 
most jurisdictions.82 
Importantly, the WTO Dispute Panel upheld the use of the Bolar 
exception as being in conformity with the requirements of the TRIPS Agreement 
in the Canada–E.U. dispute.83 Supporting the inclusion of an early use exception, 
the CIPIH Report, recommended that: 
Countries should provide in national legislation for measures to encourage 
generic entry on patent expiry, such as the “early working” exception, and 
more generally policies that support greater competition between generics, 
  
 82 In the United States, this exemption is also technically called the § 271(e)(1) 
exemption or Hatch–Waxman exemption. K. Suresh Kumar, et al., Patent Laws and 
Research Exemption Imperative—Do Scientists Have Enough Freedom to Operate?, 99 
CURRENT SCI. 1488, 1524 (2010). The U.S. Supreme Court considered the scope of the 
Hatch–Waxman exemption in Merck v Integra. Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences I, 
Ltd., 545 U.S. 193 (2005). 
The Supreme Court held that the statute exempts from infringement all uses of 
compounds that are reasonably related to submission of information to the gov-
ernment under any law regulating the manufacture, use or distribution of drugs. 
In Canada, this exemption is known as the Bolar provision or Roche–Bolar 
provision, named after the case Roche Products v. Bolar Pharmaceutical. In the 
European Union, equivalent exemptions are allowed under the terms of EC Di-
rectives 2001/82/EC (as amended by Directive 2004/28/EC) and 2001/83/EC 
(as amended by Directives 2002/98/EC, 2003/63/EC, 2004/24/EC and 
2004/27/EC). 
Research Exemption, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Research_exemption (last 
visited Apr. 16, 2014). 
 83 Azam & Mounkoro, supra note 74; see also WTO, CANADA--PATENT PROTECTION 
OF PHARMACEUTICAL PRODUCTS (WT/DS114/R) 28 (Mar. 17, 2000), available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/7428d.pdf. 
Article 30 of the TRIPS Agreement authorizes limited exceptions to patent 
rights for such things as research, prior user rights, and pre-expiration testing. 
Often called the ‘research exception,’ the provision is commonly used by coun-
tries to advance science and technology by allowing researchers to use a pa-
tented invention to gain a better understanding of the technology. In addition, 
countries also use the provision to allow manufacturers of generic drugs to ap-
ply for marketing and safety approval without the patent owner’s permission 
and before the patent protection expires. The generic producers can then market 
the drug. This practice, often called the ‘regulatory exception’ or ‘Bolar’ provi-
sion, has been upheld as conforming to the TRIPS Agreement. . . . [The Panel 
also found] that manufacturing and stockpiling patented drugs prior to the ex-
haustion of patent protection is not a “limited exception” which can be exempt-
ed under Article 30. 
Bryan Mercurio, The Impact of the Australia-United States Free Trade Agreement on the 
Provision of Health Services in Australia, 26 WHITTIER L. REV. 1051, 1065 n.39 (2005) 
(footnote and citation omitted).  
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whether branded or not, as an effective way to enhance access by 
improving affordability.84 
In addition to the Bolar exception, the “exception for research or 
experimental use of an invention also falls under the Article 30 category of 
exceptions.85 This exception is extensively used in many national patent laws 
around the world.86 It “allows the use of a patented product in experimentation, 
for both scientific as well as commercial purposes, without the consent of the 
patent holder. This exception plays a significant role in the process of 
encouraging innovation, dissemination of knowledge and transfer of 
technology.”87 
This kind of exception is important for maintaining and developing 
efficient alternatives to protect public health and to encourage innovation within 
the industry. The opportunity to use patented products for R&D purposes will 
enable the indigenous firms to be ready with efficient processes and use these 
whenever they are permitted to do so. 
The existing patent law of Bangladesh under section 21 provides for 
experimental-use exceptions. However, the language and process as mentioned 
in the existing PDA is so ambiguous and complicated that it will have no 
positive effect. The law must be amended in a way to simplify the entry of 
generic pharmaceuticals into the market. The research and experimental 
provision: 
is very important for generic entry. It permits generic entry soon after the 
patents expire and hence allows the consumers to benefit from competition 
and lower prices without delay. In the absence of it, generic companies 
  
 84 CIPIH REPORT, supra note 27, at 24. 
 85 MOHAMMED K. EL SAID, WORLD HEALTH ORG. & INT’L CTR. FOR TRADE & 
SUSTAINABLE DEV., PUBLIC HEALTH RELATED TRIPS-PLUS PROVISIONS IN BILATERAL 
TRADE AGREEMENTS: A POLICY GUIDE FOR NEGOTIATORS AND IMPLEMENTERS IN THE 
WHO EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN REGION 153 (2010), available at 
http://applications.emro.who.int/dsaf/dsa1081.pdf. See for details, CARLOS CORREA, 
INTEGRATING PUBLIC HEALTH CONCERNS INTO PATENT LEGISLATION IN DEVELOPING 
COUNTRIES (2000), available at http://apps.who.int/medicinedocs/ 
pdf/h2963e/h2963e.pdf. 
 86 Id. According to Musungu and Oh, “[n]ational laws reviewed in Latin American 
and Caribbean countries all contained provisions relating to the research or experimental 
use exception; in Asia, 85% of the national laws reviewed provided for this exception, 
although the figure is lower in Africa at 59%.” CECILIA OH & SISULE MUSUNGU, THE USE 
OF FLEXIBILITIES IN TRIPS BY DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: CAN THEY PROMOTE ACCESS TO 
MEDICINES? 32 (Aug. 2005), available at http://www.who.int/intellectual 
property/studies/TRIPSFLEXI.pdf. 
 87 El Said, supra note 85; see also CHRISTOPHER GARRISON, UNCTAD-ICTSD 
PROJECT ON IPRS AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT, EXCEPTIONS TO PATENT RIGHTS IN 
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 46, 49 (2006), available at 
http://ictsd.org/i/publications/11716/?view=document. 
 




will have to wait till [sic] the patents actually expire before they can start 
the tests necessary for getting regulatory approval.88 
It will take time to get such approvals and without such an exception, “the 
patentee will effectively enjoy monopoly status even though there are no legal 
barriers to entry.”89 However, the Draft PDA tried to simplify the process stating 
that: 
[A]ny machine, apparatus or other article in respect of which the patent is 
granted or any article made by the use of the process in respect of which 
the patent is granted, may be made or used, and any process in respect of 
which the patent is granted may be used, by any person for the sole 
purpose merely of experiment or research including the imparting of 
instruction to pupils.90 
However, the exemption, as laid down in the Draft PDA of 2010, may not 
be enough if a generic producer wants to use it for experimental purposes 
leading to the collection of data to be submitted to the drug-approval authority 
for the production of on-patent drugs.91 In the context of the terms of the 
legislative provision itself, guidance can be sought from section 107A(a) of the 
Indian Patent Act, which provides: 
[A]ny act of making, constructing, using, selling or importing a patented 
invention solely for uses reasonably related to the development and 
submission of information required under any law for the time being in 
force, in India, or in a country other than India, that regulates the 
manufacture, construction, use, sale or import of any product . . .shall not 
be considered as an infringement of patent rights.92 
In Bangladesh there are diverging opinions within the pharmaceutical industry 
regarding this. During interviews, most of the local pharmaceutical industry93 
strongly supported the inclusion of this provision to allow generic producers, 
whereas MNPCs94 thought this may discourage investment and technology 
transfer in the pharmaceutical sector. One interview participant argued that, in 
  
 88 Azam & Mounkoro, supra note 74. 
 89 Id. 
 90 Draft Patents and Designs Act, 2010 § 48(c), 2010 (Bangl.). 
 91 See Shamnad Basheer, India’s Tryst with TRIPS: The Patents (Amendment) Act, 
2005, 1 INDIAN J. L. & TECH. 15, 30 (2005), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Delivery.cfm/SSRN_ID942680_code339749.pdf?abstractid=
764066&mirid=1. 
 92 The Patent (Amendment Act) 2002, § 107A(a), 2002 (India). 
 93 During the survey, most of the local pharmaceutical companies in Bangladesh 
irrespective of size (large, medium, or small) supported this provision. 
 94 In the survey feedback, MNPCs did not answer this question, but during the 
interview MNPCs opposed this provision and considered that, in the long term, this may 
provide no benefits for Bangladesh. 
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the absence of a research and experimental-use provision, generic producers in 
Bangladesh will be restricted from experimenting with patented products.95 
Arguably, the absence of a research and experimental-use provision 
encourages the high pricing of pharmaceuticals when given the monopoly of a 
patent holder. Therefore, the present provision in Bangladesh needs to be 
extended to include a similar provision to India’s in order to facilitate generic 
entry of patented drugs as early as possible after the introduction of 
pharmaceutical patents in Bangladesh. As part of its transition to a TRIPS-
compliant regime, the legislative option of including both an early working and 
a research and experimental-use exemption should be considered. 
A further exemption that should be considered is the practice of 
permitting parallel imports. 
F. Parallel Imports 
The TRIPS Agreement provides that the patent owner has the exclusive 
right to prevent others not only from making, using or selling the invented 
product or process in the country, but also importing the product from other 
countries.96 However, this right is subject to Article 6 of the TRIPS Agreement, 
which deals with the principle of “exhaustion.”97 “The principle of exhaustion 
states that once patentholders have sold a patented product, they cannot prohibit 
the subsequent resale [or import] of that product since their rights in respect of 
that market have been exhausted by the act of selling the product.”98 In regard to 
patent exhaustion as it relates to parallel imports, Sudip Chaudhuri wrote: 
Such imports of patented products without the consent of the patent holder 
in the importing country are known as parallel imports. This is very 
important in the pharmaceutical industry because the same patented 
medicine is often sold at different prices in different countries and hence 
parallel imports permit a country to shop around for the lowest price. The 
underlying justification of allowing parallel imports is that since the 
innovator has been rewarded through the first sale of the product, its patent 
rights have been “exhausted” and hence it should have no say over the 
subsequent re-sale.99 
  
 95 Interview with an official of a public health NGO, in Dhaka, Bangl. (Feb. 9, 2009). 
 96 TRIPS Agreement, supra note 2, art. 28.1(a). 
 97 TRIPS Agreement, supra note 2, art. 6. 
 98 World Health Org., Intellectual Property Protection: Impact on Public Health, 19 
WHO DRUG INFO. 236, 240 (2005), available at 
http://apps.who.int/medicinedocs/pdf/s7918e/s7918e.pdf. 
 99 Sudip Chaudhuri, Indian Generic Companies, Affordability of Drugs and Local 
Production in Africa with Special Reference to Tanzania (Open University Research 








Article 6 of the TRIPS Agreement was further clarified by the Doha 
Declaration, which provided that each country was “free to establish its own 
regime for such exhaustion without challenge.”100 
There are three kinds of exhaustion regimes for the purpose of parallel 
imports: national, regional and international.101 The United States has adopted “a 
national exhaustion principle whereby the patent owner has no control over the 
product once it is placed in the domestic market;” however, the patent holder 
“can exercise his rights outside the US market regarding the price and quantity 
of the product.”102 In contrast, the European Union has adopted a “regional 
exhaustion principle whereby the rights are exhausted within” the boundaries of 
the European Union.103 By comparison, international exhaustion has no 
jurisdictional limit; the rights of the patent owner are exhausted once he has sold 
his product.104 International exhaustion is consistent with the objective of Article 
7 of the TRIPS Agreement.105 The advantage of international exhaustion is that 
developing countries can scout for lower-priced patented products anywhere in 
  
 100 Doha Declaration, supra note 4, at ¶ 5(d); Chaudhuri, supra note 99. 
 101 See generally Marco C.E.J. Bronckers, The Exhaustion of Patent Rights under 
WTO Law, 32 J. WORLD TRADE 137, 137–38 (1998). 
 102 N. Lalitha, Doha Declaration and Public Health Issues,13 J. INTELL. PROP. RTS. 
401, 404 (2008), available at http://nopr.niscair.res.in/bitstream/123456789 
/2026/1/JIPR%2013(5)%20401-413.pdf. 
 103 Id. 
 104 Id. 
 105 Id. A submission to the World Health Organization stated: 
Article 7 is a key provision that defines the objectives of the TRIPS Agreement. 
It clearly establishes that the protection and enforcement of intellectual proper-
ty rights do not exist in a vacuum. They are supposed to benefit society as a 
whole and do not aim at the mere protection of private rights” and should be 
utilized in a way for “the mutual advantage of producers and users of techno-
logical knowledge; social and economic welfare; and the balance of rights and 
obligations. 
COUNCIL DISCUSSION ON ACCESS TO MEDICINES, TRIPS, DEVELOPING COUNTRY GROUP’S 
PAPER—SUBMISSION BY THE AFRICA GROUP, BARBADOS, BOLIVIA, BRAZIL, DOMINICAN 
REPUBLIC, ECUADOR, HONDURAS, INDIA, INDONESIA, JAMAICA, PAKISTAN, PARAGUAY, 
PHILIPPINES, PERU, SRI LANKA, THAILAND AND VENEZUELA (IP/C/W/296) ¶ 18 (June 19, 
2001), available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/paper_ 
develop_w296_e.htm. Therefore: 
[e]ach provision of the TRIPS Agreement should be read in light of the objec-
tives and principles set forth in Articles 7 and 8. Such an interpretation finds 
support in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (concluded in Vienna 
in 23, May 1969), which establishes, in Article 31, that “[a] treaty shall be in-
terpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to 
the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and pur-
pose.” 
Id. at ¶ 17. 
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the world.106 Research conducted in a number of countries supports this claim. In 
Kenya, for example, it was found that “parallel importation reduced the price of 
first-line anti-retroviral medicines to one-third of the price of the patented 
version.”107 
In this regard, the Report on the Commission of Intellectual Property 
Rights (U.K.) stated: 
Developing countries should not eliminate potential sources of low cost 
imports from other developing or developed countries. In order to be an 
effective pro-competitive measure in a scenario of full compliance with 
TRIPS, parallel imports should be allowed whenever the patentee’s rights 
have been exhausted in the foreign country. Since TRIPS allows countries 
to design their own exhaustion of rights regimes (a point restated at Doha), 
developing countries should aim to facilitate parallel imports in their 
legislation.108 
Moreover, the CIPIH Report, Recommendation 4.19, states that 
“[d]eveloping countries should retain the possibilities to benefit from differential 
pricing, and the ability to seek and parallel import lower priced medicines.”109 
In the context of Bangladesh, one pharmaceutical market expert argued 
that “international exhaustion will be of no benefit for Bangladesh; rather, it will 
increase counterfeiting and low-quality medicine in the local market.”110 He also 
indicated that allowing cheaper medicines from other alternative sources may 
jeopardize the entire pharmaceutical market in Bangladesh with regard to the 
institutional and infrastructural limitation of the DDA because it would open 
flood gates of different products making it impossible for the DDA to inspect 
and monitor all the possible cheaper pharmaceutical products.111 However, one 
public health activist in Bangladesh argued that due to fear of counterfeiting, 
one cannot shut the door to opportunities; rather, counterfeiting can be prevented 
if the proper steps are taken.112 She further remarked that in the absence of 
parallel imports it will create a monopoly and may threaten the adequate supply 
and access to affordable pharmaceuticals.113 
  
 106 Lalitha, supra note 102. 
 107 Rohit Malpani, All Costs, No Benefits: How TRIPS-plus Intellectual Property Rules 
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The PDA of Bangladesh does not contain any provisions dealing with the 
legality or otherwise of parallel imports. Brazilian patent law also does not 
support international exhaustion.114 However, the Indian Patent Act (under 
section 107) allows parallel imports and permits the import of patented drugs at 
the lowest available price in the global market (international exhaustion). 
Section 107A(b) of the Indian Patent Act provides: “Importation of patented 
products by any person from a person who is duly authorized under the law to 
produce and sell or distribute the product, shall not be considered as an 
infringement of patent rights.”115 
The Draft PDA of Bangladesh (2010), section 92 included the following 
provision: 
Meaning of Use of Invention for Purposes of Government 
(1) For the purposes of this chapter, an invention is said to be used for 
the purposes of government if it is made, used, exercised or vended 
for the purposes of the government or a government undertaking. 
(2) Without prejudice to the generality of the provisions of sub-Section 
(1) of this Section: 
(a) the importation, by or on behalf of the government, of any 
invention being a machine, apparatus or other article covered by 
a patent granted before the commencement of this Act, for the 
purposes merely of its own use; and 
(b) the importation, by or on behalf of the government, of any 
invention being a medicine or drug covered by a patent granted 
before the commencement of this Act: 
(i) for the purpose merely of its own use; or 
(ii) for the purpose of distribution in any dispensary, hospital or 
other medical institution maintained by or on behalf of the 
government or in any other dispensary, hospital or other 
medical institution that the government may, having regard 
to the public service that such other dispensary, hospital or 
medical institution render, specify in this behalf by 
notification in the Official Gazette, shall also be deemed, 
for the purposes of this Chapter, to be use of such invention 
for the purposes of Government.116 
  
 114 See ESTHER M. FLESCH ET AL., REPORT Q 156 IN THE NAME OF THE BRAZILIAN 
GROUP: INTERNATIONAL EXHAUSTION OF INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY RIGHTS (XXXVIIIth 
World Intellectual Property Congress in Melbourne, Mar. 23–30, 2001), available at 
https://www.aippi.org/download/commitees/156/GR156brazil.pdf; see also Shamnad 
Basheer & Mrinalini Kochupillai, TRIPS, Patents and Parallel Imports: A Proposal for 
Amendment, 2 INDIAN J. INTELL. PROP. L. 63(2009), available at 
http://www.nalsar.ac.in/IJIPL/Files/Archives/Volume%202/4.pdf. 
 115 2005 Patent (Amendment) Act, No. 15 § 92(1), 2005 (India). 
 116 Draft Patens and Designs Act, 2010 § 92, 2010 (Bangl.). 
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Again, Draft Patent Ain (Law) 2012 of Bangladesh included a similar 
provision, which also authorized individuals to parallel import with permission 
from a duly empowered authority provided the individuals comply with the rules 
framed for such authorization.117 
This provision is ambiguous and only allows government institutions and 
duly-authorized institutions or individuals to make use of parallel imports. The 
existing patent act of Bangladesh (the PDA, 1911) and also draft PDA 2010 
requires a notification from duly-empowered authority or government whereas 
draft patent law of 2012 requires complying with clumsy administrative rules for 
obtaining permission for parallel imports. Considering the bureaucratic hurdles 
and delayed procedures typically faced when making a notification or getting an 
authorization, along with the dysfunctional government health services, this 
provision will have no positive effect on the availability or accessibility of 
cheaper generic drugs in Bangladesh; therefore, Bangladesh should permit 
parallel importing by anyone based on the principle of international exhaustion 
and should adopt clear and transparent procedures for granting parallel imports 
within a reasonable time. 
The Indian parallel-imports regime has some defects. For example: 
“importation of patented products by any person from any person who is duly 
authorised under the law to produce and sell or distribute the product.”118 
Therefore, it may restrict the importation of cheaper drugs unless the exporter is 
duly authorized by law to produce, sell, or distribute such drugs. Shamnad 
Basheer explained this problem with an example: suppose India’s patent laws 
prohibit production of a drug that is under a valid patent but Bangladesh’s laws 
do not. These drugs are available via import from a Bangladeshi drug producer 
because there is no pharmaceutical patent in Bangladesh, and, therefore, the 
drug producer in Bangladesh does not need any authorization from the patent 
holder.119 However, under the existing provision in India, an Indian importer 
may be barred from importing from Bangladesh because of a potential violation 
of Article 28 of the TRIPS Agreement120 as the goods produced in Bangladesh 
by a third party did not have authorization from the patent holder, were not 
distributed by the patent holder, and the patent right has not been exhausted. In 
this situation, there will be complications when trying to import drugs from 
cheaper sources that may also trigger unnecessary legal hurdles and litigation for 
violation of the TRIPS provisions. Therefore, Basheer suggested the following 
amendment to be included as section 107B, in the existing Patent Act of India: 
  
 117 Draft Patent Ain (Law), 2012 § 31, 2012 (Bangl.). 
 118 2005 Patent (Amendment) Act § 107A(b), 2005 (India). 
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purposes that product”). 
 




107B. Exhaustion of Rights 
 
(1) For the purposes of this Act, the rights of a patentee or anyone 
claiming through such patentee shall be exhausted after a patented 
article has been sold once anywhere in the world (including within 
India), by or with the authorization of such patentee.121 
This suggestion seems to be more logical because the first sale122 of a 
product anywhere in the world by the patent holder would be considered an 
exhaustion of rights and, therefore, it could be imported from anyone and from 
anywhere in the world. Bangladesh should use this approach when drafting its 
parallel-importation to ensure access to medicine at the best possible price. 
Allowing for the parallel import of pharmaceuticals may be an effective tool to 
force patent holders to sell their protected pharmaceuticals at reasonable and 
affordable prices.123 
In addition to research exceptions and parallel imports, a strong position 
within a compulsory licensing regime is important for ensuring access to 
affordable medicines. 
G. Strong Compulsory Licensing Mechanism 
The issues of compulsory licensing were: 
brought to the forefront of the international debate about intellectual 
property and public health policy in January 1998, after the Executive 
Board of the World Health Assembly adopted a resolution urging the 
member states to put public health above commercial interests and to 
review their options under TRIPS to safeguard access to essential drugs.124 
While the TRIPS Agreement does not use the term “compulsory license,” 
Article 31 of the TRIPS Agreement permits “use without authorization of the 
right holder” and includes both use by third parties and government use.125 The 
  
 121 Basheer & Kochupillai, supra note 114, at 84–85. 
 122 “Exhaustion of rights, or the doctrine of first sale, is inherent to IPRs and a 
necessity in bringing about legal certainty in downstream markets. Thomas Cottier, The 
Exhaustion of Intellectual Property Rights - A Fresh Look, 39 IIC INT’L REV. INTELL. 
PROP. & COMPETITION L. 755, 755 (2008). 
 123 See Krithpaka Boonfueng, Parallel Imports in Pharmaceuticals: Increase Access to 
HIV Drugs, THAILAND LAW FORUM (July 19, 2001), 
http://www.thailawforum.com/articles/hivdrugs1.html. 
 124 WILLIAM W. FISHER III & CYRILL P. RIGAMONTI, THE SOUTH AFRICA AIDS 
CONTROVERSY: A CASE STUDY IN PATENT LAW AND POLICY 12 (Feb. 10, 2005), available 
at http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/people/tfisher/South%20Africa.pdf; see also WORLD 
HEALTH ASSEMBLY EXECUTIVE BOARD RES., WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, REVISED 
DRUG STRATEGY (EB 101/R.24) 2 (Jan. 27, 1998), available at 
http://apps.who.int/gb/archive/pdf_files/EB101/pdfangl/angr24.pdf. 
 125 TRIPS Agreement, supra note 2, art. 31. 
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Doha Declaration clarified the WTO’s position on compulsory licensing by 
providing that “each member has the right to grant compulsory licenses and the 
freedom to determine the grounds upon which such licenses are granted.”126 
Article 31 of the TRIPS Agreement dealing with compulsory licensing 
does not clarify the grounds under which a compulsory license can be given. 
However, as stated in another article: 
[C]ertain conditions listed in the Article will have to be satisfied. These 
include: (i) that authorization of such use will have to be considered on its 
individual merits, (ii) that before permitting such use (except in such cases 
as situations of national emergencies, extreme urgency, public non-
commercial use), the proposed user will have to make efforts over a 
reasonable period of time to get a voluntary license on reasonable 
commercial terms, (iii) that the legal validity of the compulsory licensing 
decision and the remuneration will be subject to judicial or other 
independent review, and (iv) that the compulsory licenses can be 
terminated if and when the circumstances which led to it cease to exist and 
are unlikely to recur.127 
Nevertheless, there are some “[l]ess controversial grounds for issuing 
compulsory licences as contemplated in TRIPS itself” such as “[t]o correct 
anticompetitive practices,” “[n]ational emergenc[ies] or other situations of 
extreme urgency, including public health crises, and” “[p]ublic non-commercial 
use, such as to provide health care to the poor.”128 
“In all these circumstances, TRIPS Article 31 permits a Member to grant 
compulsory licences without first having to make efforts to obtain a licence from 
the patent owner [under] reasonable commercial terms and conditions.”129 
However, even in these cases the TRIPS Agreement requires the payment of 
“adequate remuneration in the circumstances of each case, taking into account 
the economic value of the [licence].”130 
In the PDA of Bangladesh, there is also a provision dealing with the issue 
of compulsory licenses. Section 22 of the PDA provides: 
(1) Any person interested may present a petition to the government 
which shall be left at the Department of Patents, Designs and Trade 
Marks, together with the prescribed fee, alleging that the demand 
for a patented article in Bangladesh is not being met to an 
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adequate extent and on reasonable terms and praying for the grant 
of a compulsory license, or, in the alternative, for the revocation of 
the patent. 
(2) The government shall consider the petition, and if the parties do not 
come to an arrangement between themselves the government may, 
as it thinks fit either dispose of the petition itself or refer it to the 
High Court Division for a decision.131 
As emphasized, there are some limitations within section 22 in the 
context of meeting the needs of the local pharmaceutical industry and in 
ensuring access to medicine. The first limitation is that the section only applies 
where a situation is one of inadequacy and unreasonable terms. These terms are 
not defined in the PDA so there is uncertainty as to the extent of these terms. 
The second limitation is that there is no expert body to deal with a compulsory 
license application; there is only a referral to the High Court Division. The third 
limitation is that the section only applies to domestic need; therefore, local 
generic producers in Bangladesh may not take the opportunity to export to 
countries having no manufacturing capacity or countries in extreme need of 
pharmaceuticals. The fourth limitation is that the section does not provide any 
clear indication as to royalties or a ceiling on the royalties in the case of a 
compulsory license. The absence of a clear provision on royalties may give rise 
to higher claims for royalties and related litigation,132 which could arguably 
create a degree of uncertainty. The fifth limitation is that the section does not 
prescribe any time limit for the conclusion of the proceedings. The sixth 
limitation is that the section does not provide that a compulsory license can be 
issued on the grounds of public interest, a health emergency, or for public non-
commercial use. Further, section 23(3) of the PDA states that “No order 
revoking a patent shall be made . . . which is at variance with any treaty, 
convention, arrangement or engagement with any foreign country.”133 Such a 
provision may be used to prevent the issue of a compulsory license or revocation 
of a patent to argue that Bangladesh is breaching the TRIPS Agreement or any 
other bilateral free trade and investment agreement. Thus, patent-holders could 
take advantage of the cumbersome procedure and frustrate the efforts of 
interested enterprises in getting compulsory licenses. Despite having a 
  
 131 The Patents and Designs Act, 1911 § 22, 1911 (Bangl.) (emphasis added). 
 132 See generally F. M. Scherer & Jayashree Watal, Post-TRIPS Options for Access to 
Patented Medicines in Developing Countries, (CMH Working Paper Series, Paper No 
WG4:1, June 2001), available at 
http://library.cphs.chula.ac.th/Ebooks/HealthCareFinancing/WorkingPaper_WG4/WG4_
1.pdf. 
 133 The Patents and Designs Act, 1911 § 23(3), 1911 (Bangl.). 
Globalizing Standard of Patent Protection in WTO Law and Policy 





compulsory license provision, the government of Bangladesh has never issued a 
compulsory license for patented drugs.134 
These limitations should be removed and the PDA amended to 
incorporate a viable compulsory licensing mechanism. In this regard, the 
legislative examples of India and Brazil may be useful. Both India and Brazil 
have included compulsory licensing mechanisms within their legislative regime. 
Such legislation has the potential to not only ensure access to medicines, but 
also enable local generic producers to export and supply generic 
pharmaceuticals to other poor countries, countries without manufacturing 
capacity or to those in urgent need of medicines.135 
Bangladesh should adopt a provision similar to the Indian provision that 
permits the issue of a compulsory license in the case of a national emergency, 
health crisis, or for public non-commercial use. For example, section 92(1) of 
the Indian Patent Act provides: 
(2) If the Central Government is satisfied, in respect of any patent in 
force, in circumstances of national emergency or in circumstances of 
extreme urgency or in case of public non-commercial use, that it is 
necessary that compulsory licences should be granted at any time 
after the sealing thereof to work the invention, it may make a 
declaration to the effect, by notification in the Official Gazette . . . .136 
Again to allow exportation under a compulsory license, section 92A of the 
Indian Patent Act states: 
(1) Compulsory licence shall be available for manufacture and export 
of patented pharmaceutical products to any country having 
insufficient or no manufacturing capacity in the pharmaceutical 
sector for the concerned product to address public health problems, 
provided compulsory licence have been granted by such country or 
such country has, by notification or otherwise, allowed importation of 
the patented pharmaceutical products from India.137 
Bangladesh should adopt a similar provision to allow local generic 
producers to exploit the opportunity to export cheap generic medicines to other 
countries that have no manufacturing capacity or that are facing an extreme 
health emergency. It is also interesting to note that the Indian Patent Act 
includes a provision listing the prime objectives for granting a patent for 
pharmaceuticals. In the event of a violation of any of these provisions, grounds 
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for the issue of a compulsory license could be raised. In this regard, section 83 
of the Indian Patent Act provides: 
Without prejudice to the other provisions contained in this Act, in 
exercising the powers conferred by this Chapter, regard shall be had to the 
following general considerations, namely: 
 
(a) that patents are granted to encourage inventions and to secure the 
Public-health Safeguards in Indian Patents Act that the inventions 
are worked in India on a commercial scale and to the fullest extent 
that is reasonably practicable without undue delay; 
(b) that they are not granted merely to enable patentees to enjoy a 
monopoly for the importation of the patented article; 
(c) that the protection and enforcement of patent rights contribute to the 
promotion of technological innovation and to the transfer and 
dissemination of technology, to the mutual advantage of producers 
and users of technological knowledge and in a manner conducive to 
social and economic welfare, and to a balance of rights and 
obligations; 
(d) That patents granted do not impede protection of public health 
and nutrition and should act as instruments to promote public 
interest, especially in sectors that are of vital importance for the 
socioeconomic and technological development of India; 
(e) that patents granted do not in any way prohibit Central Government 
in taking measures to protect public health; 
(f) that the patent right is not abused by the patentee or person deriving 
title or interest on-patent from the patentee, and the patentee or a 
person deriving title or interest on-patent from the patentee does not 
resort to practices which unreasonably restrain trade or adversely 
affect the international transfer of technology; and 
(g) that patents are granted to make the benefit of the patented invention 
available at reasonably affordable prices to the public.138 
By inserting the above section, the Indian government validated its 
present actions and any future actions as a measure to protect the public interest. 
In particular, sections 83(d) and (e) are adopted from the objectives and 
principle clause of the TRIPS Agreement,139 which validates government actions 
based upon the socioeconomic conditions of the country. Bangladesh should 
adopt a similar provision as a proactive measure so that it can validate future 
actions to protect the public interest and the socioeconomic interest and 
developmental goals of the country. 
However, commentary on the Indian compulsory licensing regime has 
highlighted a limitation of the section because there is no clear detail regarding 
the requirement to pay royalties. Gopakumar stated that “gaps in the law take 
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away the effectiveness of a compulsory license regime under the Patents Act. As 
a result, during the last five years only one application was filed for the issuance 
of a compulsory license in India.”140 
In this respect, to speed up the process of issuing compulsory licenses in 
the case of an emergency situation, either an administrative body should be 
created to deal with the application or a provision enacted to empower the 
government itself to issue a compulsory license without application. In this 
respect, Article 71 of the Brazilian Industrial Property Law provides: 
In cases of national emergency or of public interest, as declared in an 
act of the Federal Executive Power, and provided the patentholder or his 
licensee does not fulfil such need, a temporary and non-exclusive 
compulsory license for exploiting the patent may be granted, ex 
officio, without prejudice to the rights of the respective titleholder.141 
This provision empowers the Brazilian government to issue a compulsory 
license if negotiations between parties fail.142 Such a legislative option should be 
considered by Bangladesh as part of its TRIPS-compliant legislative regime. In 
the Draft PDA 2010, Bangladesh tried to use the Indian option, but the provision 
needs clarification143 because it is not clear whether exports can be made to non-
WTO member countries or those that do not have pharmaceutical patents or 
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 143 Draft Patents and Design Act, 2010, § 84, 2010 (Bangl.). 
 




patents of a particular drug.144 As the law currently stands, the issue of 
compulsory licenses is still determined by the courts, like in India, rather than by 
any specific executive body, like in Brazil. The court procedure in Bangladesh is 
overly long, costly, and complicated; therefore, this may discourage potential 
applicants from applying for compulsory licenses.  
In this regard, the IPR Commission in the United Kingdom stated that “an 
important barrier to compulsory licensing in developing countries is the absence 
of straight forward legislative and administrative procedures to put it into 
effect.”145 In addition, the CIPIH Report recommended: 
Countries should provide in their legislation powers to use compulsory 
licensing, in accordance with the TRIPS agreement, where this power 
might be useful as one of the means available to promote, inter alia, 
research that is directly relevant to the specific health problems of 
developing countries.146 
Therefore, Bangladesh should follow the Brazilian approach of issuing 
compulsory licenses and establish an expert body to deal with compulsory 
licensing issues within the shortest possible time to speed up the production of 
generic drugs in case of public-health crises. As the TRIPS Agreement does not 
prohibit administrative decision-making on compulsory licenses and 
government use of patents, establishment of an expert administrative body could 
speed up the issue of compulsory licenses and could also avoid prolonged 
litigation, as the legal systems in most developing countries and LDCs, 
including Bangladesh, are already overburdened. 
Further, the issue of reasonable remuneration is not clearly defined; 
therefore, bargaining over this issue may also unnecessarily delay the procedure 
of issuing compulsory licenses. In this case, Bangladesh could perhaps adopt the 
Canadian approach of fixing royalties based on the United Nations’ Human 
  
 144 Although it is not clarified in the Draft Patents and Design Act 2010, the Draft 
Patent Act of 2012 under section 14(18) provides that compulsory licenses can be granted 
for pharmaceutical exports to countries having inadequate or no manufacturing capacity. 
See Draft Patent Act, 2012 (available only in Bangla), available at 
http://www.moind.gov.bd/index.php?option=com_docman&task=doc_download&gid=8
21&Itemid=236. However, the draft law of 2012 included a separate provision in section 
30 that compulsory licenses including pharmaceutical export licenses could not be 
granted in Bangladesh unless the August 30th TRIPS amendment becomes effective in 
Bangladesh. See id. 
 145 INTEGRATING REPORT, supra note 28, at 8. 
 146 CIPIH REPORT, supra note 27, at 176. 
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Development Index (HDI)147 with a slight modification. The same formula 
should be used based on ranking of the country where the manufactured drugs 
under the compulsory license are to be exploited, because the Canadian model 
only accounts for exports based on the destination of the drugs (the importing 
country).148 Bangladesh still holds a very low ranking in the HDI, and most of 
the exporting destinations of Bangladeshi pharmaceutical products are still in the 
  
 147 “The Human Development Index (HDI) is a measure of life expectancy, literacy, 
education, and standard of living for countries worldwide. It is a standard means of 
measuring well-being, especially child welfare.” CENTRE FOR ENVIRONMENT EDUCATION, 
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT: AN INTRODUCTION 17 (2007). It is used to determine 
whether the country is a developed, a developing, or an under-developed country, and 
also to measure the impact of economic policies on quality of life. Id. The origins of the 
HDI are found in the annual Human Development Reports of the United Nations 
Development Programme (UNDP). Sakiko Fukuda-Parr, The Human Development 
Paradigm: Operationalizing Sen’s Ideas on Capabilities, 9 FEMINIST ECON. 301, 303 
(2003). It was devised by economist Mahabub-ul Haq in 1990 with the explicit purpose 
“‘to shift the focus of development economics from national income accounting to people 
centered policies.’” Id. (citation omitted). For more information, see Human Development 
Index (HDI), Human Development Reports, UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT 
PROGRAMME, http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/hdi (last visited Mar. 24, 2014). 
 148 According to James Love: 
In 2005, Canada proposed royalty guidelines for the export of medicines under 
the Jean Chrétien Pledge to Africa Act, which implements the WTO waiver of 
Article 31(f) of the TRIPS Agreement. The Canadian royalty guidelines are a 
sliding scale of the generic sales price. The rate depends entirely upon the loca-
tion of the importing market and the rank of the importing country in the [Unit-
ed Nations Human Development Index] (UNHDI). The formula is one, plus the 
number of countries on the UNHDI, minus the importing country’s rank on the 
UNHDI, divided by the number of countries on the UNHDI, multiplied by 
0.04. The rate is then applied to the generic sales price.  
With 177 countries currently in the UNHDI index, the royalty rate can be ex-
pressed as: Royalty rate = 0.04 * [(178)–rank importing country]/177. 
JAMES LOVE, REMUNERATION GUIDELINES FOR NON-VOLUNTARY USE OF A PATENT ON 
MEDICAL TECHNOLOGIES 72 (2005), available at 
http://www.who.int/medicines/areas/technical_cooperation/WHOTCM2005.1_OMS.pdf. 
During the time of adoption of this royalty approach in 2004, the top rate was 4% of the 
generic sales price for Norway, as it was the number one country in the HDI in 2004, and 
the lowest rate was 0.02% for Sierra Leone as it was lowest ranking country in the HDI in 
2004. Id. See for details MOHAMMAD MONIRUL AZAM, REVISITING THE CLIMATE CHANGE 
NEGOTIATION UNDER THE UNFCCC: IN SEARCH OF EFFECTIVE FRAMEWORK FOR 








lower level of the HDI.149 With this modification, Bangladesh would be able to 
produce drugs locally using compulsory licenses, or it could use compulsory 
licenses for exporting by paying the minimum fixed royalties without any 
cumbersome bargaining. 
Furthermore, the government of Bangladesh may need to modify existing 
provisions that regulate “local working” of the patent or related provisions 
concerning patented products manufactured or processes used outside of 
Bangladesh. Section 23 of the PDA provides that: 
(1) At any time not less than four years after the date of a patent granted 
under this Act, any person may apply to the Government for relief under 
this section on the ground that the patented article or process is 
manufactured or carried on exclusively or mainly outside Bangladesh.  
(2) The Government shall consider the application, and, if after inquiry it 
is satisfied-  
(a) that the allegations contained therein are correct; and  
(b) that the applicant is prepared, and is in a position, to manufacture 
or carry on the patented article or process in Bangladesh; and  
(c) that the patentee refuses to grant a license on reasonable terms, 
then, subject to the provisions of this section, and unless the patentee 
proves that the patented article or process is manufactured or carried 
on to an adequate extent in Bangladesh, or gives satisfactory reasons 
why the article or process is not so manufactured or carried on, the 
Government may make an order  
(d) revoking the patent. . . .150 
The existing patent law of Bangladesh does not contain any definition of 
the term “manufactured or carried on exclusively or mainly outside Bangladesh” 
as mentioned in section 23 of the PDA. This absence of a definition may result 
in varied and ambiguous interpretations. Again, section 23 of the PDA requires 
that four years should lapse from the date of granting of a patent and only then 
can one apply for the revocation of patents on the ground of “non-working in the 
territory” of Bangladesh.151 Therefore, the ambiguity of the existing provision 
and the four year requirement will delay the entry of cheaper local 
pharmaceuticals. This will allow the MNPCs to enjoy a monopoly for their 
patented pharmaceuticals without any transfer of technology and investment for 
local manufacture as they will rely on the manufacturing facilities outside of 
  
 149 The ranking of Bangladesh in the HDI of 2010 was 129. UNITED NATIONS DEV. 
PROGRAMME, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2010, THE REAL WEALTH OF NATIONS: 
PATHWAYS TO HUMAN DEVELOPMENT, 145 (2010), available at 
http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/reports/270/hdr_2010_en_complete_reprint.pdf. For 
the HDI of other countries, see id. at 143–46. 
 150 The Patents and Designs Act, 1911 § 23, 1911 (Bangl.). 
 151 Id. 
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Bangladesh. In this regard, section 84 of the Indian Patent Act152 and Article 68 
of the Brazilian Industrial Property Act (1996)153 may be models for Bangladesh, 
which so far have successfully resisted the pressure of the United States and 
MNPCs.154 
The Indian Controller of Patents, while disposing of an application for 
compulsory license in Natco Pharma Ltd. v. Bayer Corp.,155 clarified the issue of 
working of the patent in the territory of India. The Controller noted that the term 
“worked in the territory of India” had not been defined in the Indian Patent Act, 
and so he needed to interpret the term with regard to “various International 
Conventions and Agreements in intellectual property,” the 1970 Patent Act and 
the legislative history.156 The Controller, using Article 27(1) of the TRIPS 
Agreement and Article 5(1)(A) of the Paris Convention, supported an 
interpretation that failure to manufacture in India supported the grant of a 
compulsory license to Natco stating that: “[p]atents are not granted merely to 
enable patentees to enjoy a monopoly for importation of the patented article” 
and that “the grant of a patent right must contribute to the promotion of 
technological innovation and to the transfer and dissemination of technology.”157 
  
 152 2005 Patent (Amendment) Act § 84, 2005 (India): 
Compulsory licences. –  
(1) At any time after the expiration of three years from the date of the grant of a 
patent, any person interested may make an application to the Controller for 
grant of compulsory licence on patent on any of the following grounds, name-
ly–  
(a) that the reasonable requirements of the public with respect to the patented 
invention have not been satisfied, or (b) that the patented invention is not avail-
able to the public at a reasonably affordable price, or (c) that the patented in-
vention is not worked in the territory of India. 
 153 Lei No. 9.279 art.68, de 14 de maio de 1996, Diario Oficial Da Uniao [D.O.U.] de 
15.05.1996. (Braz.), translated in Brazil: Industrial Property Law, 14/05/1996, No. 9.279, 
http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/details.jsp?id=515 (last visited Mar. 24, 2014): 
(1) The following also occasion a compulsory license:  
I. non-exploitation of the object of the patent within the Brazilian territory for 
failure to manufacture or incomplete manufacture of the product, or also failure 
to make full use of the patented process, except cases where this is not econom-
ically feasible, when importation shall be permitted; or  
II. commercialization that does not satisfy the needs of the market. 
 154 See generally Daya Shanker, India, the Pharmaceutical Industry and the Validity of 
TRIPS, 5 J. WORLD INTELL. PROP. 315 (2002); see also Daya Shanker, Brazil, 
Pharmaceutical Industry and the WTO, 5 J. WORLD INTELL. PROP. 53 (2002). 
 155 Compulsory License Application No. 1 of 2011, Application for Compulsory 
License Under Section 84(1) of the Patents Act, 1970 in Respect of Patent No. 215758, 
Natco Pharma Ltd. v. Bayer Corp. (Mar. 9, 2012), available at 
http://www.ipindia.nic.in/iponew/compulsory_license_12032012.pdf. 
 156 Id. at 39–45. 
 157 Id. at 43. 
 




Therefore, considering the experiences of India, the government of 
Bangladesh may adopt the following provision on the working of the patent in 
the territory of Bangladesh: 
“Compulsory License for Non-Working in the territory of Bangladesh  
 
At any time after the expiration of three years from the date of the grant of 
a patent, any person interested may make an application to the Department 
of Patents, Designs and Trademarks or to the duly authorised office for 
grant of a compulsory license on patent on any of the following grounds, 
namely –  
(a) that the reasonable requirements of the public with respect to the 
patented invention have not been satisfied . . . 
(ii) the demand for the patented article has not been met to an 
adequate extent or on reasonable terms . . . 
(b) that the patented invention is not available to the public at a 
reasonably affordable price  
(c) that the patented invention is not worked in the territory of 
Bangladesh. 
Explanation: This section is to be applied to the extent giving due 
consideration to the fact that patents are not granted merely to enable patentees 
to enjoy a monopoly for importation of the patented article, but the grant of a 
patent right must contribute to the promotion of technological innovation and to 
the transfer and dissemination of technology. 
During the interview, most of the participants argued that Bangladesh 
should have strong compulsory licensing mechanisms.158 However, one 
participant argued that compulsory licenses are not a viable option as they will 
discourage technology transfer and foreign direct investment in Bangladesh.159 
Another participant commented that the provision alone is not enough if the 
procedure is complicated and results in an inordinate delay in issuance of 
compulsory licenses.160 Using the experiences of India and Brazil, if Bangladesh 
can include a compulsory license provision in its future amended patent law that 
avoid clumsy and complicated procedures, it will help ensure access to 
pharmaceuticals in the event of a public-health emergency in Bangladesh and 
provide a competitive advantage to its local pharmaceutical industry when 
exporting to any other country having low or no manufacturing capacity.  
  
 158 During interviews, the issues of compulsory licensing were supported by most of 
the executives of local pharmaceutical companies irrespective of size (large, medium, and 
small). That support was echoed by public health NGOs and local researchers. 
 159 Interview with a policy analyst of an MNPC operating in Bangladesh, in Dhaka, 
Bangl. (Mar. 09, 2012). 
 160 Interview with a policy analyst of an international NGO working in Bangladesh, in 
Dhaka, Bangl. (Mar. 10, 2012). 
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Similarly, Bangladesh should include a prior-use exception to protect 
local producers within the pharmaceutical industry. 
H. Prior-use Exceptions 
Considering the number of local generic producers in Bangladesh and the 
magnitude of investment made in the area of cheap generics, the prior-use 
exception should be incorporated into Bangladesh’s TRIPS-compliant patent 
law. In a study by the World Bank, the Indian example of prior user rights is 
referred to as a “Grandfather clause” or automatic compulsory license illustrated 
as follows: 
Generic versions of patented medicine can continue to be manufactured in 
India provided that: (1) the generic manufacturer was producing and 
marketing the product prior to January 1, 2005; (2) the generic 
manufacturer made significant investment in the production and marketing 
for the product; and, (3) a reasonable royalty is paid to the patent holder.161 
During field studies in Bangladesh, a majority of the participants strongly 
supported the inclusion of a prior user rights provision similar to India’s.162 
However, one participant argued that this kind of provision will discourage 
foreign direct investments and transfer technology in Bangladesh.163 
The Indian example of prior-user rights has some weaknesses. It may be 
challenged by the patent holder on a number of grounds, such as it was not 
exploited prior to January 1, 2005 or prior to introduction of pharmaceutical 
patents, investment is not sufficient (as there is no indication in the law, how 
much investment is to be considered as sufficient), or the reasonable royalty rate 
may be challenged. These weaknesses may create barriers for generic 
production. In this case, the Brazilian provision should perhaps be replicated in 
Bangladesh, which has no such limitations. Such an exception is contained in 
Article 45 of Brazil’s Industrial Property Law and provides that: 
A person who in good faith, prior to the filing or priority date of a patent 
application, was exploiting the object thereof in this country, shall be 
  
 161 THE WORLD BANK, PUBLIC AND PRIVATE SECTOR APPROACHES TO IMPROVING 
PHARMACEUTICAL QUALITY IN BANGLADESH 15 (Mar. 2008), available at http://www-
wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2008/09/01/00033495
5_20080901071115/Rendered/PDF/451900NWP0Box31uality0no2301PUBLIC1.pdf. 
 162 This has been mentioned by a number of large, medium, and small pharmaceutical 
companies in Bangladesh and was also supported by officials at the patent office and 
directorate general of drug administration, Bangladesh. 
 163 Interview with CEO of an MNPC operating in Bangladesh, in Dhaka, Bangl. (Mar. 
9, 2012). 
 




assured the right to continue the exploitation, without onus, in the same 
manner and under the same conditions as before.164 
While the above legislative options go towards defining the matters of 
patentability and exceptions, a provision related to patent application objection 
procedure should also be included. 
I. Pre-grant and Post-grant Opposition 
Pre-grant and post-grant opposition “is an important way to assist and 
encourage public interest groups and local generic pharmaceutical companies to 
oppose attempts by others” who seek patents.165 An opposition provision is 
currently contained in Bangladesh under section 9(1) of the PDA, which 
provides: 
Any person may, on payment of the prescribed fee, at any time within four 
months from the date of the advertisement of the acceptance of an 
application, give notice at the Department of Patents, Designs and Trade 
Marks of opposition to the grant of the patent on any of the following 
grounds, namely: 
 
(a) that the applicant obtained the invention from him, or from a person 
of whom he is the legal representative or assign; or 
(b) that the invention has been claimed in any specification filed in 
Bangladesh which is or will be of prior date to the patent, the grant of 
which is opposed; or 
(c) that the nature of the invention or the manner in which it is to be 
performed is not sufficiently or fairly described and ascertained in the 
specifications; or 
(d) that the invention has been publicly used in any part of Bangladesh or 
has been made publicly known in any part of Bangladesh; or 
(e) that the complete specification describes or claims an invention other 
than that described in the provisional specification, and that such 
other invention either forms the subject of an application made by the 
opponent for a patent, which if granted would bear a date in the 
interval between the date of the application and the leaving of the 
complete specification, or has been made available to the public by 
publication in any document published in Bangladesh in that interval; 
but on no other ground.166 
  
 164 Lei No. 9.279 art. 45, de 14 de maio de 1996, Diario Oficial Da Uniao [D.O.U.] de 
15.05.1996. (Braz.), translated in Brazil: Industrial Property Law, 14/05/1996, No. 9.279, 
http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/details.jsp?id=515 (last visited Mar. 24, 2014). 
 165 Mohammad Azam & Kristy Richardson, Pharmaceutical Patent Protection and 
Trips Challenges for Bangladesh: An Appraisal of Bangladesh’s Patent Office and 
Department of Drug Administration, 22 BOND L. REV. 1, 8 (2010). 
 166 The Patents and Designs Act, 1911 § 9(1)), 1911 (Bangl.) (emphasis added). 
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As emphasized above and in a study by Azam and Richardson, objections 
to the provision are limited by two conditions. The first limitation “is that the 
objection must be made within four months of the advertisement of the 
acceptance of the application.”167 The second limitation is that the objection can 
only be based on the grounds provided by section 9(1).168 It further stated that 
“[i]f defects in the patent application are revealed, or identified after the four 
month period, no objection can be raised against the patent application. In other 
words, the existing legislative regime does not permit any type of post-grant 
opposition.”169 “This is in contrast to the legislative equivalent in India which 
not only contains eleven grounds for pre-grant opposition but also permits post-
grant opposition.”170 
“The Indian grounds for post-grant opposition are broad enough to 
challenge novelty, inventive steps and the process of industrial application, best 
method, claims and disclosure of origin and even the use of indigenous or local 
knowledge.”171 Given this comparison, it is suggested that the existing 
Bangladeshi provision is not sufficient and should be amended to include more 
extensive pre-grant heads of objection as well as a process for post-grant 
opposition. 
In taking such a legislative step it is further suggested “that the heads of 
objection should be as wide as possible so that the twin aims of ensuring access 
to medicine with the aim of promoting innovation within the pharmaceutical 
industry are not hampered.”172 During field studies in Bangladesh, a majority of 
the participants opined that the Indian example of pre-grant and post-grant 
opposition may need to be replicated in Bangladesh.173 But, one participant 
argued that the local pharmaceutical industry and public health organizations in 
Bangladesh lack adequate expertise and resources to effectively exploit pre-
grant and post-grant opposition; therefore, they should prepare themselves to use 
the proposed provision for pre-grant and post-grant opposition effectively.174 
Another participant also criticized that there is no accessible online information 
about ongoing patent applications in Bangladesh and that even a paper copy of 
DPDT’s journal is not distributed regularly; therefore, interested parties will 
  
 167 Azam & Richardson, supra note 165, at 8. 
 168 Id. 
 169 Id. 
 170 Id. at 8 n.31. 
 171 Id.; see also Archana Shanker & Neeti Wilson, The Patent Opposition System in 
India, IAM MAGAZINE 14 (July 8, 2010), http://www.iam-
magazine.com/issues/article.ashx?g=4ed76a24-e544-4547-a651-84c0542aecd1. 
 172 Azam & Richardson, supra note 165, at 8–9. 
 173 During interviews, this view was echoed by most of the officials of large, medium, 
and small pharmaceutical companies in Bangladesh and also supported by local IP 
academics and public health NGOs. 
 174 Interview with IP academic at the University of Chittagong, in Chittagong, Bangl. 
(Mar. 5, 2012). 
 




have extreme difficulties in collecting the required information to oppose any 
patent application or granted patent.175 Therefore, simply having this provision 
may not be enough unless access to information regarding patent applications 
and granted patents is regularly updated and available for review by interested 
parties. One participant in the interview argued that this provision may open the 
flood gates to unnecessary opposition and may even frustrate investments in the 
pharmaceutical sector.176 
The issue of how long a patent should last also needs consideration. 
J. Duration of Patent Protection 
Under section 14 of the PDA of Bangladesh, patent protection is available 
for sixteen years. The TRIPS Agreement requires that patent protection be 
available for twenty years. The Brazilian Industrial property law simply 
indicates that patent protection shall be for twenty years from the date of 
filing.177 Indian Patent law extends the duration to twenty years subject to the 
patent legislation in India, and that duration is to be counted from the date of 
filing: 
Subject to the provisions of this Act, the term of every patent granted, after 
the commencement of the Patents (Amendment) Act, 2002, and the term 
of every patent which has not expired and has not ceased to have effect, on 
the date of such commencement, under this Act, shall be twenty years 
from the date of filing of the application for the patent.178 
While the TRIPS Agreement limits the ability of Bangladesh to explicitly 
reduce a patent period, the legislative amendment should contain a qualification. 
To that extent, it is suggested that while amending the PDA to be TRIPS 
compliant, Bangladesh could include that the “duration of protection is subject 
to exceptions as included in this Act or to be included by any future 
amendments.” Such an extension may provide the government with some 
freedom to act as times change and TRIPS compliance is assessed. It will also 
permit the government to act immediately in case of a health emergency or to 
act because of some other type of public interest. During the interview, some 
participants considered this kind of reservation to be useful to limit patent 
  
 175 Id. 
 176 Interview with CEO of an MNPC operating in Bangladesh, in Dhaka, Bangl. (Mar. 
7, 2012). 
 177 Lei No. 9.279 art. 40, de 14 de maio de 1996, Diario Oficial Da Uniao [D.O.U.] de 
15.05.1996. (Braz.), translated in Brazil: Industrial Property Law, 14/05/1996, No. 9.279, 
http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/details.jsp?id=515 (last visited Mar. 24, 2014) (“An 
invention patent shall remain in force for a period of 20 (twenty) years, and a utility 
model patent for a period of 15 (fifteen) years from the date of filing.”). 
 178 2005 Patent (Amendment) Act, § 53(1), 2005 (India). 
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protection, if necessary, on public interest grounds.179 However, one participant 
argued that limiting patent protection will discourage investment in the 
pharmaceutical sector; rather, he argued that twenty years is not sufficient to 
recover investment and that the duration should be extended to thirty years in 
the pharmaceutical sector.180 
The United States and the European Union (as insisted and supported by 
their MNPCs), while negotiating bilateral investment agreements with the 
developing countries and the LDCs, including Bangladesh, insisted on the 
inclusion of extended periods for pharmaceutical patents beyond twenty years in 
order to compensate the originator of the drug for the time lost during the patent 
application and drug registration procedures.181 The United States and the 
European Union considered this a legitimate right which must be granted in 
order to “compensate” its pharmaceutical companies for any “unreasonable” 
delays throughout the patent examination or the registration process.182 
But “[t]he costs of patent term extension are grave.”183 For example, “a 
recent study in the Republic of Korea concluded that the extension of patent 
terms is likely to cost the Korean National Health Insurance Corporation . . . 
504.5 billion won (US $529 million) for extending drug patents for three years 
and 722.5 billion won (US $757 million) if it has to agree to a four-year 
extension as proposed under [Free Trade Agreement] negotiations with the 
United States.”184 
The TRIPS Agreement “is clear regarding this term of protection. It does 
not specify that a member state is obliged to extend the patent protection term 
for any reason (including delays in registering drugs or issuing patents) beyond 
the term prescribed under Article 33.”185 
In this regard, the CIPIH Report stated that “[b]ilateral trade agreements 
should not seek to incorporate TRIPS-plus protection in ways that may reduce 
  
 179 From interview data (this has been supported by many large, medium, and small 
local pharmaceutical companies in Bangladesh). 
 180 Interview with executive of a MNPC operating in Bangladesh, in Dhaka, Bangl. 
(Mar. 9, 2012). 
 181 See Emily Jones, Signing Away the Future: How Trade and Investment Agreements 
Between Rich and Poor Countries Undermine Development (Oxfam Briefing Paper No. 
101, March 2007), available at http://www.oxfam.org/sites/www.oxfam.org/ 
files/Signing%20Away%20the%20Future.pdf. 
 182 Id. 
 183 El Said, supra note 85, at 145. 
 184 Id.; see also U.S. FTA May Cost Drug Industry $1.2 Billion: Gov’t, THE 
HANKYOREH (Oct. 17, 2006), 
http://english.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_business/165065.html. 
 185 El Said, supra note 85, at 144; see INT’L CENTRE FOR TRADE AND SUSTAINABLE 
DEV., RESOURCE BOOK ON TRIPS AND DEVELOPMENT (2005). It should be noted that 
patent term extensions were proposed by the developed countries and rejected by the 
developing countries during the Uruguay Round. 
 




access to medicines in developing countries.”186 Therefore, LDCs such as 
Bangladesh should not adopt patent term extension under the patent regime and 
should not agree in any future FTAs for patent terms beyond the TRIPS 
Agreement. Again, the government of Bangladesh needs to craft enforcement 
provisions in a way so as not to become a barrier to the production and supply of 
generic drugs. 
K. Not to Adopt Overprotective Enforcement Provisions 
LDCs such as Bangladesh should be aware that the TRIPS Agreement 
only sets minimum requirements with respect to enforcement of IPRs. However, 
there has been an increased focus on strengthening mechanisms for enforcement 
of IPRs far beyond what is required by the TRIPS agreement through so called 
“anti-counterfeiting” initiatives.187 The developing countries and LDCs are 
increasingly under pressure to place criminal sanctions on a wide array of IPR 
violations, including patent infringement.188 But placing criminal sanctions on 
  
 186 CIPIH REPORT, supra note 27, at 182. 
 187 See generally GLOBAL COMM’N ON HIV AND THE LAW, REGIONAL ISSUES BRIEF: 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND ACCESS TO MEDICINES 22 (Feb. 17, 2011), 
available at http://www.ippacificislands.org/health/IssuesBrief_IPR.pdf. For example: 
In 2008, Kenya enacted its Anti-Counterfeit Act, purportedly designed to ad-
dress the problem of counterfeit goods, including substandard and spurious 
medicines. It attached harsh criminal sanctions related to counterfeiting. How-
ever, according to the definition of the Act safe, effective and legitimate gener-
ic medicines were also considered “counterfeit.” By conflating the issues of 
safety, quality and efficacy, and the separate field of intellectual property, the 
Act potentially criminalized the manufacture, import, export, possession or sale 
of perfectly safe generic medicines. Kenya’s Anti-Counterfeit Act was chal-
lenged before the High Court in July 2009 by three petitioners living with HIV 
on the basis that impinges on their constitutional right to health. The Court 
passed preliminary judgment in favour of petitioners on 23 April, 2010 and 
suspended powers of Anti-Counterfeit Agency to interfere with importation and 
distribution of generics pending ruling on the substance.  
UNITED NATIONS DEV. PROGRAMME, GOOD PRACTICE GUIDE: IMPROVING ACCESS TO 
TREATMENT BY UTILIZING PUBLIC HEALTH FLEXIBILITIES IN THE WTO TRIPS AGREEMENT 
47 (2010) [hereinafter GOOD PRACTICE GUIDE], available at 
http://content.undp.org/go/cms-service/stream/asset/?asset_id=3259443. 
 188 See generally Ermias Biadgleng & Viviana Tellez, The Changing Structure and 
Governance of Intellectual Property Enforcement (S. Ctr. Research Paper No. 15, Jan. 
2008), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1210622; Susan 
Sell, The Global IP Upward Ratchet, Anti-Counterfeiting and Piracy Enforcement 
Efforts: The State of Play (Am. Univ. Wash. Coll. L. Prog. Info. Justice & Intell. Prop., 
PIJIP Research Paper Series. No. 15, 2010), available at 
http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/research/15/. 
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patent infringement (e.g., considering generic medicines “counterfeit”189) can 
restrict access to medicines and, therefore, “could have a chilling effect on 
generic manufacturers’ willingness to enter the market with affordably priced 
generic medicines.”190 
On the other hand, “overbroad powers granted to customs officials, have 
already been used to hinder the legitimate trade of affordable generic medicines” 
under the pretext of counterfeiting and infringement.191 For example, in 2009, 
Dutch authorities seized a shipment in transit of the generic drug Abacavir 
produced in India, purchased by UNITAID192 and on its way to Africa, on 
grounds that the generic version of the medicine violated patent rights in 
Europe.193 
The use of the term “counterfeit” medicines became further controversial 
when the WHO-IMPACT meeting in December2008 suggested that a medical 
product is counterfeit when there is a false representation in relation to its 
identity, history or source, its container, packaging or other labeling 
  
 189 See generally CARLOS CORREA, CENTRE FOR INTERDISCIPLINARY STUDIES ON 
INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY AND ECONOMICS, THE PUSH FOR STRONGER ENFORCEMENT RULES: 
IMPLICATIONS FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (2007); Michael Blakeney, International 
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Concern with Counterfeiting and Piracy, INTELL. PROP. Q. 1 (2009). 
 190 UNITED NATIONS DEV. PROGRAMME, supra note 187, at 46. 
 191 Id.; see Henning Grosse Ruse-Khan & Thomas Jaeger, Policing Patents 
Worldwide? EC Border Measures Against Transiting Generic Drugs Under EC and 
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MEDICINES (Feb. 2, 2011), available at 
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020211-en.pdf. 
 192 UNITAID is the first global health organization that “uses innovative financing to 
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and tuberculosis in low-income countries.” About Unitaid, UNITAID, 
http://www.unitaid.eu/en/who/about-unitaid (last visited Apr. 20, 2014). It is “[b]ased in 
Geneva and hosted by the World Health Organization, approximately half of UNITAID’s 
finances come from a levy on air tickets.” Id. It “was established in 2006 by the 
governments of Brazil, Chile, France, Norway and the United Kingdom as the 
‘International Drug Purchasing Facility.’” Id. It is now backed by an expanding north-
south membership, including Cyprus, Korea, Luxembourg, Spain, Cameroon, Congo, 
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like the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation. Id. 
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information.194 On the other hand, the 66th meeting of the WHO Regional 
Committee for South East Asia rejected the WHO-IMPACT definition of 
counterfeit drugs. Recognizing the need to separate IP issues from quality and 
safe medical products, the draft resolution urged member countries to refrain 
from IP enforcement that compromises access to medicines.195 In this regard, the 
Indian Pharmaceutical Alliance (IPA) argues that the references to “history” and 
“source” in the WHO-IMPACT definition suggest patent infringement and that 
this might affect exports of generics (from India) because it wrongly leads the 
public to believe that generics are counterfeits.196 Therefore, India requested the 
original WHO definition of counterfeit medicines be maintained: 
A counterfeit medicine is one which is deliberately and fraudulently 
mislabeled with respect to identity and/or source. Counterfeiting can apply 
to both branded and generic products and counterfeit products may include 
products with the correct ingredients or with the wrong ingredients, 
without active ingredients, with insufficient active ingredients or with fake 
packaging.197 
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However, the TRIPS Agreement does not require the criminalization of 
patent infringement, and it limits criminalization obligations to a limited class of 
wilful trademark counterfeiting and copyright piracy on a commercial scale.198 
Neither Brazil nor India has adopted any overprotective enforcement 
mechanisms that could criminalize generic production and supply. Therefore, 
while instituting TRIPS-compliant enforcement obligations within domestic 
patent law and pharmaceutical regulations, the government of Bangladesh, 
rather than adopting overprotective provisions that would hamper supply of 
generic medicines, should focus on efforts to strengthen drug regulatory 
authorities, promote rational use and public awareness not to sell, buy, or 
distribute any fake or counterfeit medicines, and avoid not defining the 
counterfeiting of medicines so as to include patent infringement. 
Apart from the above legislative options, the government of Bangladesh 
should consider some additional interventions to ensure access to medicines and 
to promote pharmaceutical innovation in the process of moving towards a 
TRIPS-compliant regime. 
II. GOVERNMENT-INTERVENTION OPTIONS 
Although the patenting of pharmaceuticals and consequent impact on 
pharmaceutical price is not the only issue affecting access, it is considered a 
significant barrier and one that is common to all developing countries, whatever 
their stage of development.199 That is why, during the interviews in Bangladesh, 
most of the participants echoed that simply using the flexibilities available in the 
TRIPS Agreement when drafting national patent laws will not improve access to 
medicines in Bangladesh, especially when the country’s economic development, 
health infrastructure, drug distribution, and drug availability is in disarray.200 
There is also fear that achievements made thus far through the local production 
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of pharmaceuticals will not continue if MNPCs and developed countries put 
pressure on Bangladesh to refrain from producing and exporting cheaper generic 
drugs that compete with the more expensive patented brands produced by the 
MNPCs.201 
However, MNPCs and developed countries like the United States and the 
European Union are not yet pressuring Bangladesh for pharmaceutical patents. 
As an LDC, Bangladesh still can waive compliance with the pharmaceutical 
patents of the TRIPS Agreement. Additionally, Bangladesh is not a competitive 
threat yet because it is not a country that promises huge profits.202 Some critics 
consider that, “[d]espite having 125 million people, the average wage, life 
expectancy, and literacy rates are among the lowest in the world,” and its local 
pharmaceutical industry is incapable of making the raw materials for new drugs; 
hence, MNPCs are not interested in putting any pressure on Bangladesh.203 In 
1997, the U.S. Embassy in Bangladesh reported: “Intellectual property 
infringement is common, but is currently of relatively limited significance for 
US firms.”204 According to Oxfam, “[t]his attitude may change soon, as it has 
happened in other poor countries such as Ghana and Uganda, where 
multinational companies have already acted to stop them importing cheaper 
generic drugs, which compete with the more expensive patented brands of 
medicine.”205 Therefore, apart from reforming patent law, Bangladesh may need 
to consider some other alternative governmental-intervention options to ensure 
access to medicines.206 
Supporting alternative measures apart from market-based instruments, Dr. 
Zafarullah Chowdhury remarked that: 
Medicines are one commodity you can’t leave to market forces. The 
market is simply not competent. . . It makes for monopolies and cartels, 
not competition. And every drug is, by definition, essential. If you have a 
malfunctioning liver and only one drug can save your life, that to you is 
the most essential drug in the world. Allowing the global drug market to 
be controlled by foreign firms (with lengthy periods of patent control) is 
not going to help us.207 
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Dr. Chowdhury further added that “[l]ocal drug firms have no innovative 
technology, therefore when Bangladesh is bound to honour foreign patents on 
new drugs ‘that could be our collapse.’”208 
Another renowned public-health activist in Bangladesh, Farhad Mazahar, 
remarked that “[t]he impact [of pharmaceutical patents] on Bangladesh will be 
huge because most of our raw materials [for new and existing drugs] come from 
India. . . . Our companies are only pharmacies, really [not the pharmaceutical 
industry itself].”209 Therefore, considering the delicate infrastructure of the 
public-health situation, the low level of access to medicines, and lack of 
innovation among the local pharmaceutical industries in Bangladesh, it is 
suggested that Bangladesh may adopt some alternative measures using the 
examples of Brazil, India, and South Africa, which are: (i) drug price control; 
(ii) national competition law; (iii) the introduction of the patent prize system; 
(iv) limiting data protection; (v) developing a patent pool on country specific 
diseases; (vi) avoiding TRIPS-plus requirements in any future bilateral 
investment agreements (BITs) or under Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) with the 
developed countries more particularly with the United States and the European 
Union; (vii) lobbying for the further extension of the transitional period for 
pharmaceutical patents; (viii) introducing process patents only for limited 
periods and adopting a utility model law; and (ix) instituting the Special 
Investment Protection Regime, an open source drug innovation, and the Social 
Business Model in the pharmaceutical sector. 
A. Drug Price Control 
Affordability of medicines by individual patients in the LDCs is an 
important factor influencing access to care and treatment.210 However, control 
over the cost of medicines exists in one form or another in most countries. For 
example, in Australia, “new drugs with no advantage over existing products are 
offered at the same price.”211 “Where clinical trials show superiority, 
incremental cost effectiveness is assessed to determine whether a product 
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represents value for money at the price sought.”212 In the United Kingdom, the 
pharmaceutical price-regulation scheme (PPRS), a voluntary agreement between 
the United Kingdom’s Department of Health and the Association of the British 
Pharmaceutical Industry exists so that companies negotiate profit rates from 
sales of drugs to the National Health Service (NHS).213 In France, Italy, and 
Belgium, prices are set in relation to the relative cost and the contribution made 
to the national economy.214 
In Bangladesh, there is no drug price-control mechanism under the 
existing Patent Act. However, the Drug Control Ordinance of 1982 provides for 
the fixing of prices by a committee appointed by the government.215 The 
committee mostly deals with essential medicines, as listed by the DGDA in 
Bangladesh. Accordingly, no such listed drugs can be circulated without such 
pricing controls.216 
This is a vital guarantee that the prices of pharmaceuticals, whether 
produced nationally or imported from the outside, will not increase without prior 
government authorization.217 Further, it is within the government’s purview to 
refuse the registration of any pharmaceuticals that are regarded as too expensive 
or unaffordable.218 
In 1982, 150 pharmaceuticals were defined as essential pharmaceuticals219 
and any changes to prices were decided by the Drug Control Committee. 
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However, since 1993, the number of price-controlled pharmaceuticals has 
reduced to 117 primary health-care pharmaceuticals.220 The Drug Control 
Ordinance 1982 has empowered the government to determine the maximum 
retail price (MRP) of 117 essential drug-chemical substances. The MRP is 
broken down into trade price (75.5%), wholesale commission (2.3%), retail 
commission (12.0%), and value-added tax (12.5%) for local products.221 The 
breakdown for imported products is made into trade price (88.89%) and retail 
commission (11.11%).222 
Non-essential drugs are priced through a system of indicative prices. The 
rule is applicable only in the case of locally-produced goods. A fixed percentage 
of mark-up is applied to the cost and freight price of finished goods to determine 
the MRP of imported finished goods. This is followed irrespective of whether 
they are essential or non-essential products. Therefore, for pharmaceuticals that 
do not fall into the controlled category, the manufacturer is able to set the price 
of the pharmaceutical. In principle, this does not mean that an exorbitant price 
can be set by a manufacturer, as the price must be approved (but not controlled) 
by the Drug Control Committee.223 But in practice, the Committee accepts the 
pricing as offered by the manufacturers or importers if it is not within the list of 
essential medicines; no other stakeholders have a say in fixing the price.224 
Therefore, sometimes manufacturers or importers can fix higher prices if it is 
not within the essential medicines list in Bangladesh, and the Committee will 
not object or criticize the pricing.  
The list needs to be updated from time to time, as in some cases the old 
listed medicines may not work and patients will need expensive new medicines 
that are often beyond price control. One such situation is found in multi-drug 
resistance, where the older drugs are not working and yet the patient is unable to 
buy the new expensive drugs. Dr. Zaman Khan explained the situation in 
Bangladesh: 
We have recently lost four patients to multi-drug resistance disease. 
Eventually there will be new drugs but they will be even more expensive 
than the antibiotics we use now, Cefrazidine from Glaxo, for instance, at 
450 taka ($8) a dose or Ceftriazone from Roche, at 500 taka ($9).  
 
Very few people can even afford the drugs we have got. . . . We ask 
patients about their economic history and then we decide who can and 
can’t afford drugs. But I would say 70% of the people we see cannot 
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afford to buy medicines. Even the cheaper versions are often beyond 
them.225 
This view is supported by Dr. Khurshid Talukder of the Institute of Child and 
Mother Health in Bangladesh: 
“We just want the best possible answers to treat all diseases. Simply, we 
must have the drugs here when they are available in developed countries. 
And they have to be affordable for poorer people to buy.” People are often 
too poor to buy the correct drugs needed to cure an illness or cannot 
complete the full course of medicines, which in turn leads to more 
resistance.226 
Public health activists and generic producers in Bangladesh raising concerns 
about the possible negative impact of TRIPS on the public health situation in 
Bangladesh say that “people of Bangladesh could be very seriously affected. It 
is an alarming and dismal picture.”227 
That is why most of the public-health NGOs and public-health experts in 
Bangladesh believe that the government of Bangladesh should establish a 
permanent price-control mechanism accessible to the general public and public-
health groups to make the existing price-control mechanism more effective.228 
Any individual or public-health group should then be permitted to challenge or 
review the pricing of medicines on social or health grounds.229 Another concern 
is that there are a number of pharmacies in the country that operate without a 
license and sell pharmaceuticals to customers without a prescription and at a 
higher price.230 
The Committee should be given jurisdiction to deal with these issues, and 
the public-health interest groups should be able to access the Committee.231 An 
example of such a body is the Canadian Patented Medicine Prices Review Board 
(PMPRB), established in 1987 under the Patent Act as an independent quasi-
judicial tribunal, which limits the prices set by manufacturers for all patented 
medicines, new and existing, sold in Canada, under prescription or over the 
counter, to ensure pricing is not excessive.232 As an independent quasi-judicial 
body, the PMPRB carries out its mandate independently of other organizations, 
such as Health Canada, which approves drugs for safety and efficacy, and public 
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drug plans, which approve the listing of drugs on their respective formularies for 
reimbursement purposes.233 
The PMPRB has a dual role of regulating and reporting.234 Its regulatory 
role is to protect consumers and contribute to Canadian health care by ensuring 
that prices charged by manufacturers for patented medicines are not excessive.235 
Its reporting role contributes to informed decisions and policy-making by 
reporting on pharmaceutical trends and on the R&D spending by pharmaceutical 
patentees.236 This Board is unique in the sense that it was set up exclusively to 
monitor the prices of patented drugs. Besides, the Board also analyzes the 
therapeutic contribution of patented pharmaceuticals, and it documents 
pharmaceutical R&D investment in Canada. A similar mechanism should be 
considered by Bangladesh as it moves towards a TRIPS-compliant patent 
regime. 
However, it is interesting to note here that, aside from some small 
pharmaceutical companies, both the leading local pharmaceutical industries in 
Bangladesh and the MNPCs operating in Bangladesh oppose the price-control 
mechanism.237 One participant during the interview argued that “some 
companies are trying to seize the market with the low price low quality products 
which may become a real threat for public health.”238 This was also supported by 
another participant claiming that price control may encourage cheap drugs and 
may, in a way, encourage low quality counterfeited pharmaceuticals.239 The 
CEO of one small pharmaceutical company argued that that the “withdrawal of 
price control will become a threat for access to medicines and for their (small 
pharmaceutical companies) survival” as well.240 He further added that “it is 
better to have price control to encourage local competition and ensure 
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affordability of pharmaceuticals for the local people.”241 The Bangladesh 
Association of Pharmaceutical Industries made no comment about this, as it 
considered this an issue of contention both from legal and political perspectives 
and agreed that in their organization there is a conflict of opinions among the 
members.242 Yet, public-health NGOs and IP academics in Bangladesh support a 
broadening of the role of price control and believe any attempt to withdraw price 
control will be a disaster.243 One official at the DPDT in Bangladesh argued that 
“reality shows that even the Government is not able to control price effectively 
with the present ordinance. So the non-existence of price control would 
definitely lead towards the real disaster in terms of access to drugs.”244 He 
further added that “in the absence of it, the price of drugs would be sky-high, 
which would ultimately lead towards the real obstacle in order to access to 
drugs.”245 
In India, there is a National Pharmaceutical Pricing Authority (NPPA) 
which was established under the Drugs (Prices Control) Order, 1995246 and 
entrusted to fix or revise the prices of controlled bulk drugs and formulations 
(bulk drugs are price-controlled like the essential medicines list in Bangladesh) 
and to enforce prices and availability of medicines in India. It has also been 
empowered with the task of recovering amounts overcharged by manufacturers 
for controlled drugs from the consumers, and it also monitors the prices of 
decontrolled drugs in order to keep them at reasonable levels. But, drug-control 
mechanisms in India are also considered ineffective, as explained by the 
taskforce popularly known as Dr. Pronab Sen Task Force, which was formed by 
the government of India to evaluate the drug-control mechanisms in India.247 
The taskforce argued that “no price regulatory mechanism can be effective 
unless there is a credible threat of price controls being imposed and enforced. 
However, it is also felt that often the present price control system is 
inappropriate, inadequate, cumbersome, and time consuming.”248 
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The taskforce further recommended that “[p]rice controls should be 
imposed not on the basis of turnover, but on the ‘essentiality’ of the drug and on 
strategic considerations regarding the impact of price control on the therapeutic 
class. This must be a dynamic process.”249 “The ceiling prices of controlled 
drugs should normally not be based on cost of production, but on readily 
monitorable market-based benchmarks.”250 Some other recommendations of the 
taskforce which may also be relevant for Bangladesh are as follows: 
 A process of active promotion of generic drugs should be put in 
place, including mandatory debranding for selected drugs. 
 All public health facilities should be required to prescribe and 
dispense only generic drugs, except in cases where no generic 
alternative exists. 
 In the case of proprietary drugs, particularly anti-HIV/AIDS and 
Cancer drugs, the government should actively pursue access 
programmes in collaboration with drug companies with differential 
pricing and alternative packaging, if necessary. 
 Public Sector Enterprises (PSEs) involved in the manufacture of 
drugs should be revived where possible and used as key strategic 
interventions for addressing both price and availability issues. 
Arrangements may need to be made to ensure their continuing 
viability. 
 Fiscal incentives should be provided on a long-term assured basis to 
research and development activities in drugs.251 
One public health activist remarked that the government of Bangladesh 
should also appoint a taskforce to review its drug control mechanism and that it 
would benefit immensely from the Indian taskforce report suggestion to 
restructure the existing drug-control mechanism.252 However, another participant 
remarked that the Canadian approach is free from the problems identified by the 
Indian taskforce, and, therefore, an agency like in Canada—empowered with the 
recommendations made by the Dr. Pronob Sen Task Force particularly regarding 
promotion of generic drugs and revival of public sector enterprise such as 
essential drugs limited (governmental pharmaceutical manufacturing facility in 
Bangladesh)—may help Bangladesh to develop a unique mechanism to maintain 
access to medicines, to assess the R&D investment in the pharmaceutical sector, 
and to feed information back to the government on such matters as incentives 
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like tax exemption and other policy measures.253 Some researchers such as A. K. 
Monawar Uddin Ahmad stated that “the withdrawal of price controls of many 
pharmaceutical products did not lead to any rise in the price level . . . [and] the 
MRP of some finished formulations [actually] reduced due to competitive bulk 
drug pricing.”254 
However, price control also has some built-in limitations or problems, 
such as it could disrupt the balance between supply and demand in the market. If 
prices are held below natural levels, resources such as talent and investor capital 
leave an industry to seek a better return elsewhere.255 Therefore, there will be 
less discovery and innovation and fewer new drugs will become available to 
consumers.256 Although supply and demand shift constantly based on the price 
of raw materials, production costs, and local needs, the government price will 
change only after a lengthy political and bureaucratic process. That is why the 
government price will effectively never be an equilibrium price, which means 
that the government price will be either too high or too low.257 Price control also 
could affect openness of competition and the availability of alternatives; hence, 
it would tend to discourage rapid entry of generic medicines.258 
In the context of Bangladesh, one important element that needs serious 
consideration is that the majority of drug costs are privately paid for in the 
absence of an effective health insurance system that provides access and 
availability to all.259 Price regulation in most of the countries oriented towards 
the determination of prices involve a government purchasing the medicines for 
delivery through the public health system or fixing the reimbursement rates 
against insurance claims, but rarely fixing prices prevailing in the open 
  
 253 Interview with an IP lawyer working as an in-house legal counsel and regulatory 
affairs adviser at a local pharmaceutical company, in Dhaka, Bangl. (Feb. 13, 2012). 
 254 A.K. Monaw-war Uddin Ahmad, Competition, Regulation and the Role of the 
State: The Case of Bangladesh, 53 J. ASIATIC SOC’Y OF BANGL. 199, 211 (2008). 
 255 Fiona M. Scott Morton, The Problems of Price Controls, REGULATION 50 (2001), 
available at http://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/serials/files/regulation/ 
2001/4/morton.pdf. 
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 257 Id. at 53. 
 258 See Patricia Danzon & Michael Furakawa, Prices and Availability of 
Pharmaceuticals, 27 HEALTH AFF. 221, 225 (2005). 
 259 See generally Wendy J Werner, Micro-insurance in Bangladesh: Risk Protection 
for the Poor?, 27 J. HEALTH POPULATION & NUTRITION 563 (2009), available at 
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2928102/pdf/jhpn0027-0563.pdf. 
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market.260 Leading large and medium pharmaceutical companies are now more 
interested in exporting to other countries rather than supplying the local market 
due to low profits from price-controlled products.261 Again, MNPCs operating in 
Bangladesh are not interested in supplying products in the local market that are 
under price control and have low profit margins.262 In the absence of production 
by the MNPCs and of inadequate supply from leading local companies, small 
pharmaceutical companies with inadequate quality control are trying to seize the 
gap. Unless the price control mechanism works efficiently and timely with 
proper information about the market and relevant products, excessive price 
control in the long run will not give optimal results for public health in 
Bangladesh; rather, it could create a market for low-quality cheaper products. 
Considering the limitations of price control, competition law may be an 
additional instrument for Bangladesh. 
B. National Competition Law 
While implementing the TRIPS Agreement, members can prevent the 
abuse of IPRs and control anti-competitive practices either by integrating 
competition rules into the national IP law or by framing a separate competition 
law to prevent abusive monopoly practices or the abuse of a dominant 
position.263 Article 8.2 of the TRIPS Agreement permits WTO members to adopt 
“[a]ppropriate measures . . . to prevent the abuse of intellectual property rights” 
. . . or . . . practices which unreasonably restrain trade or adversely affect the 
international transfer of technology,” whereas Article 40 of the TRIPS 
Agreement recognizes the possible link between intellectual property laws and 
competition policy.264 Therefore, the use of competition law and policy could 
  
 260 For example, in the United Kingdom, “public health and insurance takes care of 
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Narayan, Some Approaches to Pricing Controls for Patented Drugs in India, 41 ISAS 
INSIGHTS 1, 2 (Dec. 1, 2008), available at 
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 262 Interview with public health activists, in Dhaka, Bangl. (Mar. 16, 2012). All 
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margins. 
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provide developing countries with several advantages including:265 (a) countries 
will have flexibilities under the TRIPS Agreement to use a competition 
framework appropriate to their socioeconomic condition; (b) countries will have 
the freedom to define what constitutes anti-competitive behavior; (c) 
competition law and policy is well suited for implementation by an independent 
competition authority vested with extensive investigative powers; and (d) 
competition law and policy has already been used successfully by South Africa 
to reduce the price of essential medicines. 
A World Bank study emphasizing the importance of developing and 
institutionalizing appropriate competition policy by the developing countries and 
LDCs stated: 
Unless developing countries rapidly establish adequate competition 
frameworks and regulatory institutions that also address monopoly abuse 
of [intellectual property rights], it is possible that increasing [intellectual 
property right] protection could result in welfare losses from monopoly 
behavior.266 
Therefore, the government of Bangladesh should consider using the national 
competition law in a way to prevent the abuse of monopoly pricing during the 
post-TRIPS patent regime. Brazil introduced new competition law in December 
2010,267 whereas India enacted a competition law in 2002.268 However, India and 
Brazil have yet to effectively use competition law or policy for the 
pharmaceutical sector, whereas South Africa has already successfully 
  
 265 Tenu Avafia et al., The Ability of Select Sub-Saharan Africa Countries to Utilize 
TRIPS Flexibilities and Competition Law to Ensure a Sustainable Supply of Essential 
Medicines: A Study of Producing and Importing Countries 2–4 (tralac Working Paper, 
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MARKETS 147 (2002), available at http://www.ctc-health.org.cn/file/2009083127.pdf. 
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No. 8,884 of June 11, 1994 (Braz.). 
 268 In India, the Competition Act was enacted in 2002 to replace the Monopolies and 
Restrictive Trade Practices (MRTP) Act, 1969. Terry Calvani & Karen Alderman, Bric in 
the International Merger Review Edifice, 43 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 73, 74 n.3 (2010). It 
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implemented and tested its competition law in the pharmaceutical sector, and, 
therefore, South African competition law appears to have a viable role to play in 
reducing the price of medicines.269 Therefore, the model of South African 
competition law should be adapted to suit Bangladesh’s unique national 
circumstances. 
In South Africa, the Medicines and Related Substances Control 
Amendment Act270 created ground for using competition law to ensure access to 
medicines in case of excessive pricing and abuse of a dominant position. This 
Act was enacted in response to the HIV/AIDS crisis that the country had been 
facing and in response to the lack of access to pharmaceuticals due to cost. 
Section 15C, considered controversial by the MNPCs, reads: 
Section 15C - Measures to ensure supply of more affordable medicines 
 
The Minister may prescribe conditions for the supply of more affordable 
medicines in certain circumstances so as to protect the health of the public, 
and in particular may - 
 
(a) notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in the Patents Act, 
1978 (Act 57 of 1978) determine that the rights with regard to any 
medicine under a patent granted in the Republic shall not extend to 
acts in respect of such medicine which has been put onto the market 
by the owner of the medicine, or with his or her consent; 
(b) prescribe the conditions on which any medicine which is identical in 
composition, meets the same quality standard and is intended to have 
the same proprietary name as that of another medicine already 
registered in the Republic, but which is imported by a person other 
than the person who is the holder of the registration certificate of the 
medicine already registered and which originates from any site of 
manufacture of the original manufacturer as approved by the council 
in the prescribed manner, may be imported.271 
The above provision authorizes the South African government to 
determine to what extent a specific drug patent will apply. This provision was a 
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direct challenge to the pharmaceutical industry.272 Such an enactment 
demonstrates that in becoming TRIPS compliant, a nation may avail itself of 
some latitude within the flexibilities allowed under the TRIPS Agreement; 
particularly, in pursuance of the imperative of public welfare. 
The South African Competition Commission has already applied 
competition law successfully in the pharmaceutical sector to deal with restrictive 
practices and abuse of a dominant position. In Hazel Tau and Others vs. 
GlaxoSmithKline and Boehringer Ingelheim, the prices set by these two 
companies were considered an obstacle to access to antiretroviral medicines.273 
The Competition Commission ruled that they had violated the Competition Act, 
1998 by “1. Den[ying]a competitor access to an essential facility[,] 2. Excessive 
pricing[,] and 3. Engag[ing] in an exclusionary act,” whereas the pharmaceutical 
companies were merely exercising the exclusive right they were granted through 
their patent as in many other countries.274 Yet, the Commissioner stated: 
Our investigation revealed that each of the firms has refused to license 
their patents to generic manufacturers in return for a reasonable royalty. 
We believe that this is feasible and that consumers will benefit from 
cheaper generic versions of the drugs concerned. We further believe that 
granting licenses would provide for competition between firms and their 
generic competitors. We will request the Tribunal to make an order 
authorising any person to exploit the patents to market generic versions of 
  
 272 According to Court Case Between 39 Pharmaceutical Firms and The South African 
Government, CPTECH, http://www.cptech.org/ip/health/sa/pharma-v-sa.html (last visited 
Apr. 5, 2014): 
A group of 39 pharmaceutical companies has dropped its lawsuits against the 
government of South Africa. They had taken South Africa to court over its 
Medicines and Related Substances Act. The main issue was Amendment 15(c) 
which would allow TRIPS-compliant compulsory licensing and parallel im-
ports of medicines in South Africa. The suit was first filed on February 18, 
1998.  
On March 6, 2001, the South African court hearing the case ruled that the 
Treatment Access Campaign (TAC) would be granted a friend of the court role. 
It also adjourned the case until April 18, bowing to threats from the PMA to file 
an appeal on the grounds that they needed additional time to response [sic] to 
the new evidence and issues raised by TAC.  
On April 19, 2001, the pharmaceuticals companies, under an extremely high 
amount of international pressure, dropped their case. 
 273 See Competition Commission Finds Pharmaceutical Firms in Contravention of the 
Competition Act, CPTECH (Oct. 16, 2003), 
http://www.cptech.org/ip/health/sa/cc10162003.html (last visited Apr. 24, 2014). 
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the respondents’ patented medicines or fixed dose combinations that 
require these patents, in return for the payment of a reasonable royalty.275 
Even though the two companies denounced the complaint as unfounded, 
they compromised with the Commission and granted voluntary licenses to 
produce a generic version of their patented pharmaceuticals. Since this case, 
there has been huge success in South Africa toward providing access to 
pharmaceuticals for anti-HIV and AIDS.276 
The government of Bangladesh enacted Competition Act, 2012 in June, 
2012.277 According to one study, “A draft bill for such a law was first proposed 
in 1996; however, it took sixteen years to finally come to fruition.”278 The 
progress of the bill was delayed: “the political will to implement a competition 
law is limited, and there [was] some opposition from business groups.”279 
Indeed, competition problems are potentially more serious in a country such as 
Bangladesh, which has “a weaker private sector, where one or a few dominant 
firms can take control” and abuse their dominant position.280 The media 
coverage suggests that “Bangladesh may suffer from significant competition 
problems, with substantial costs to consumers” and to the public-health sector of 
Bangladesh, more particularly.281 
The government of Bangladesh should use the competition law given that 
its objective should be the welfare of its population. Despite the enactment of 
the competition law back in 2012, it has yet to be implemented as the Ministry 
of Commerce in Bangladesh has not adopted rules required to enforce it.282 
However, when considering some weaknesses within South African competition 
law, it is suggested that in any future Bangladeshi competition law, “to increase 
its effectiveness as a tool for reducing prices of essential medicines,” any 
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competition commission should be empowered with the authority to issue 
compulsory licenses, to recommend fixed royalty rates and also to expressly 
allow for the export of products produced under compulsory licenses in order to 
maintain sustainable investment.283 In addition, LDCs such as Bangladesh may 
also stipulate in national competition law that compulsory licensing could be 
granted in cases of anticompetitive behavior such as in the case of the patent 
holder’s unilateral refusal to grant a license (refusal to deal).284 Competition law 
could also be applied in the case of obtaining pharmaceutical patents in an 
unjustified and fraudulent manner.285 Again, the issues of “poor quality” and 
“frivolous” patents and regulatory practices such as marketing approval and data 
exclusivity can also be controlled under competition law.286 
During an interview, the participant argued that use of competition law 
would be a viable tool for Bangladesh to prevent excessive pricing and to allow 
generic production of particular pharmaceutical products if there is any abuse of 
dominant position as it would be extremely difficult for Bangladesh to allow a 
compulsory license under the patent law due to political pressure from the 
developed countries.287 In contrast, another participant argued that even use of 
competition law may not be so easy as it may also face political pressure and the 
competition authority should also have enough expertise and resources to guide 
its reasoning.288 
Another alternative government-intervention mechanism is a prize 
system. 
C. Introduction of Patent Prize System 
The use of patent prizes as an alternative to patents as proposed by some 
scholars such as Joseph E. Stiglitz could address the lack of incentive for 
problems such as disease in developing countries and would provide 
  
 283 Avafia et al., supra note 265, at 6. 
 284 See Carlos M. Correa, Intellectual Property and Competition Law: Exploring of 
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immediately affordable pricing for products still under patent protection.289 In a 
prize system, “[i]nstead of authorizing drug developers to exclude competitors, 
the government would pay successful developers,” and, therefore, “[o]ther 
firms, including generic drug manufacturers, would be free to make and sell the 
drugs in question.”290 It is also stated that, in some studies, many drug 
companies spend much of the money earned through patents on marketing and 
advertising as opposed to researching for the new drugs.291 
However, “[t]he controversy between a patent and prize systems [sic] 
reaches as far back as the nineteenth century” where “commentators proposed 
‘bonuses’[be] granted to inventors by the government, professional associations 
financed by private industries, intergovernmental agencies, or an international 
association funded by private industries” internationally.292 Michael Polanvyi 
trumpeted the idea of prizes as a means of patent reform back in 1944 stating 
that “[i]n order that inventions may be used freely by all, we must relieve 
inventors of the necessity of earning their rewards commercially and must grant 
them instead the right to be rewarded from the public purse.”293 However, these 
suggestions did not garner much support.  
The Royal Academy of Science in Paris had a prize system that “served 
as a model for scientific societies in other countries during the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries. The lack of a central authority or specific policy for prize 
distribution” made the prize system contentious and, some claimed, corrupt.294 
“Academy members were at odds when trying to determine which fields should 
receive general prizes,” and “[s]uch disputes were only partly resolved by 
commissions represented by multiple disciplines. At the same time, prizes were 
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becoming increasingly a matter solely of money, not honor.”295 The “ultimate 
question of whether the costs outweigh the benefits of a prize system over a 
patent system remains open” and is one that “can only be answered 
empirically.”296 There are few studies that have focused on the economic effects 
of prizes,297 and there is no consensus on how prize systems should be 
designed.298 
Nevertheless, a prize system may be designed to encourage local 
pharmaceutical companies and MNPCs to invest in R&D for the diseases most 
prevalent in Bangladesh. A prize system is justified on the grounds that granting 
patents stimulates a monopoly rather than the R&D necessary to deal with 
particular problems of a country without resources such as Bangladesh, or of 
inventing something where there is no hope of a huge profit.299 Further, it is 
criticized that “the patent system and other exclusive rights contribute to high 
drug prices, global health inequities, limited access to potentially life-saving 
medicines and medical technologies, and the production of drugs that have little 
incremental therapeutic value.”300 In a system that rewards patent owners, 
pharmaceutical companies will target only affluent patients who can pay more 
or significantly higher prices that cover the cost of research, development, and 
marketing; therefore, “pharmaceutical companies have little incentive to invest 
in R&D for low-return . . . neglected diseases, or other ‘non-profitable’ 
diseases.”301 The World Health Organization “estimates approximately ten 
million lives could have been saved with access to existing medicines and 
  
 295 Id. 
 296 Id. at 31. 
 297 See generally Lee N. Davis, Should We Consider Alternative Incentives for Basic 
Research? Patents vs. Prizes (2002) (unpublished manuscript), available at 
www.druid.dk/conferences/summer2002/Papers/DAVIS.pdf. 
 298 Michael Abramowicz, Perfecting Patent Prizes, 56 VAND. L. REV.115, 121 (2003). 
 299 See generally Davis, supra note 297. 
 300 Wei, supra note 292, at 26 (footnote omitted). Many authors have criticized the 
growing numbers of “me-too” drugs on the market, products that duplicate the 
therapeutic value of already existing drugs. See Aidan Hollis, An Efficient Reward 
System for Pharmaceutical Innovation 6 (June 10, 2004) (unpublished manuscript), 
available at http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1& 
ved=0CCgQFjAA&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.who.int%2Fintellectualproperty%2Fnew
s%2FSubmission-Hollis6-Oct.pdf&ei=_NtaU6e8LeeCyAGmr4DYDQ&usg=AFQjCNG-
8dN4dHWIGNvPtp9YIl-bmeuEDQ&sig2=ZlShHqeLTATOwf1gDOB8sA; Youngme E. 
Moon & Kerry Herman, Marketing Antidepressants: Prozac and Paxil (Harvard Business 
School Case 502-055, Oct. 2005). For an argument favorable toward “me-too” drugs for 
creating competition, see Thomas H. Lee, “Me-too” Products: Friend or Foe?, 350 NEW 
ENG. J. MED. 211 (Jan. 15, 2004). 
 301 Wei, supra note 292, at 26. Only 10% of the world’s expenditure on R&D is spent 
on targeting 90% of the disease burden. Id. at 26 n.5 (citing Amy Kapczynski et al., 
Addressing Global Health Inequities: An Open Licensing Approach for University 
Innovations, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1031, 1042–57 (2005). 
Globalizing Standard of Patent Protection in WTO Law and Policy 





vaccines. The deadweight loss of monopoly pricing of drugs is anywhere 
between $3 billion to $30 billion annually for the U.S. drug market alone.302 In 
this context, a prize system has three underlying goals: (i) to provide incentives 
for R&D in new, significantly better medicines; (ii) to enhance access to 
medicines; and (iii) to focus more resources on non-profitable diseases such as 
neglected diseases.303 
Considering potential benefits and limitations, Bangladesh could 
introduce a prize system while maintaining the patent system initially rather than 
preventing patents altogether. The prize system should have as its principle 
queries: (1) the number of patients benefited by the invention/innovation; (2) 
“the incremental therapeutic benefits of the innovation; (3) the degree to which 
the innovation addresses healthcare needs, including global infectious diseases, 
orphan illnesses, and neglected diseases affecting the poor in developing 
countries; and (4) ‘[t]he improved efficiency of manufacturing processes for 
drugs.’”304 
During World Health Assembly 60.30: 
The governments of Bolivia, Suriname and Bangladesh present[ed] for 
discussion a proposal concerning the possible use of prizes as a new 
incentive mechanism for innovation in new cancer treatments and vaccines 
that would separate rewards to innovation from the price of the products. 
. . . 
 
This proposal is based on an earlier proposal presented by the governments 
of Barbados & Bolivia in April 2008 during the WHO Intergovernmental 
Working Group on Public Health, Innovation and Intellectual Property.305 
As mentioned in the proposal, “[a]ccess to new cancer treatments and vaccines 
in developing countries is limited, due to several factors including, but not 
limited to: poor medical infrastructure; inadequate screening; and the high costs 
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of oncology equipment, services and medicines.”306 It also mentioned that 
“[h]igh prices for new cancer drugs and vaccines either discourage use 
completely, or place enormous burdens on the healthcare budgets of developing 
countries. Treatments for several new cancer drugs exceed [U.S.] $50,000 per 
completed course.”307 
However, this was not a proposal for a global prize fund; rather, it 
suggested that “national governments in developing countries introduce a new 
system of rewarding the development of new medicines and vaccines for 
cancer.”308 Specifically, it proposes “that developing countries de-monopolize 
the entire sector of medicines and vaccines for cancer, and permit free entry by 
generic suppliers.”309 The proposal further states that “[i]n return for ending the 
monopoly, developing country governments would offer to provide a domestic 
system of rewards for developers of new medicines and vaccines for cancer that 
is based on a fixed percentage of the national budget for cancer treatments.”310 
It was argued that such a proposal is consistent with the TRIPS 
Agreement as developing countries “can eliminate the exclusive rights to use 
patented inventions, in cases where patent owners receive remuneration or 
compensation.”311 However, there has been no outcome from this proposal. 
Again, “[o]n February 24, 2005, some 162 leading medical researchers, NGOs, 
parliamentarians, government officials, and other stakeholders submitted a letter 
to the [WHO] asking that it evaluate a proposal for a new global treaty to 
support medical R&D.”312 The letter proposed “to deal with higher drug prices 
for consumers in developed and developing countries by introducing a Medical 
R&D Treaty Framework that could ultimately replace existing or planned trade 
agreements that focus on patents or drug prices.”313 
According to a paper by Andrew Farlow: 
In late 2005 Kenya formally submitted a resolution to the WHO’s 
Executive Board (WHO EB) asking for the creation of a working group of 
member states to consider the [Medical R&D treaty (MRDT)]. In January 
2006 Brazil co-sponsored the resolution. Subsequently, the WHO EB 
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approved a heavily bracketed version of a draft resolution. That draft was 
debated at the World Health Assembly (WHA) in late May 2006.314 
The MRDT would require all countries—rich and poor—to pledge to spend a 
fixed percent of their Gross Domestic Product (GDP) on medical R&D.315 The 
WHO Consultative Expert Working Group (CEWG) report also proposed the 
creation of a new binding agreement to provide billions of dollars annually for 
R&D to address the special health care needs of poor persons living in 
developing countries, and to introduce new approaches to funding R&D that 
included open innovation models, the delinkage of R&D costs from product 
prices and technology transfer and capacity building in developing countries.316 
However, the CEWG report also stated that “[w]e see a convention not as a 
replacement for the existing intellectual property rights system, but as a 
supplementary instrument where the current system does not function.”317 
“Although the sponsors believe that a treaty on MRDT would 
considerably ‘transform the landscape of biomedical innovation to incorporate 
needs-driven health research and development,’ several developed country 
members, primarily the U.S. and the EU, said that the WHO was not an 
appropriate forum for discussing the treaty.”318 Finally the WHO negotiations on 
MRDT ended without any concrete action, and, instead, the WHO deferred the 
issues until 2016 by deciding to convene another open-ended meeting of 
Member States prior to the 69th WHA in May 2016 to assess progress and 
continue discussions on the remaining issues in relation to monitoring, 
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coordination and financing for health R&D.319 Public health groups like 
Knowledge Ecology International criticized the outcome by saying that: 
A treaty on R&D financing would have not have cost the United States 
any money, while creating obligations on other countries to pay more for 
global health R&D projects. The only reason for blocking this initiative 
was to protect the existing drug development business model. The existing 
model benefits big pharma the most, and exploits consumers and 
marginalizes the poor.320 
On the basis that there is no international scheme, Bangladesh would try a 
country-specific prize fund based on the most preventable diseases in 
Bangladesh. During surveys of the pharmaceutical companies in Bangladesh, 
none of them showed any interest in the prize system. However, pharmaceutical 
researchers and public health NGOs termed this as a viable option during 
interviews.321 
Limiting data protection could also be a policy position in need of 
consideration by the government of Bangladesh. 
D. Limit Data Protection 
Pharmaceutical companies are required to submit test and clinical data 
relating to safety and efficacy to national health authorities to get marketing 
approval for any newly-developed pharmaceuticals.322 The data exclusivity 
provisions “refer to a practice whereby, for a fixed period of time, national drug 
regulatory authorities prevent and block the registration files of an originator to 
be used to register a therapeutically equivalent generic version of that medicine 
without obtaining the consent of the patent holder unless the generic 
manufacturer actually conducts the clinical trials again.”323 
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Supporters of data exclusivity provisions consider it important to 
compensate for inordinate delays in granting patents and also to recover 
investment and research costs for the innovators. On the other hand, generic 
companies believe: 
Data exclusivity has nothing to do with protecting research data. Long 
after the data exclusivity period has expired, the originator documentation 
remains protected by copyright laws and other legal provisions. Data 
exclusivity merely extends the originator company’s market monopoly 
over a product by not allowing the authorities to process an application for 
marketing authorisation.324 
Therefore, “[d]ata exclusivity can be a barrier to generic entry irrespective of 
whether the drug was patented, or if the patent period has expired.”325 
In India, when generic companies apply for approval of a pharmaceutical, 
they are not required to conduct their own studies and submit independent 
data.326 Rather, companies can rely on the safety and efficacy data submitted by 
the innovator company to get marketing approval for their products.327 
Article 39.3328 of the TRIPS Agreement is being interpreted by some 
multinational companies and some developed countries, particularly in the 
United States, “to mean that WTO member countries are required to grant data 
exclusivity for a specified period of time.”329 Yet, in tracing the history and the 
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text of Article 39, scholars “have concluded that the protection need not be in 
the form of data exclusivity.”330 
If data exclusivity “were the intention then the terms ‘exclusive rights’ 
would have been used as in Article 70.9” of the TRIPS Agreement.331 Article 
39.3 of the TRIPS Agreement “requires countries to protect data against ‘unfair 
commercial use.’”332 Additionally, “countries have the discretion to [protect 
data] not through data exclusivity but by proscribing situations where a 
competitor obtains the results of testing data through fraud, breach of confidence 
or other ‘dishonest’ practices and derive a commercial advantage.”333 Thus, 
“[p]rotection is not necessary if regulatory authorities do not require the 
submission of such data for marketing approval or if the data are already 
public.”334 Protection should only be required for new chemical entities so that 
each country can have considerable freedom “in defining what is ‘new,’ and 
may exclude the different formulations based on the same chemicals.”335 
Thus the TRIPS Agreement requires “data protection” but does not 
require data exclusivity as there is a clear distinction between these two 
concepts. Data exclusivity involves a monopoly right over test data for a certain 
period of time, whereas data protection only requires authorities to keep the data 
confidential. In a WHO study it is quite clearly mentioned that: 
Given the negative impact on public health and access to medicines of 
providing for data exclusivity, it is important that developing countries try 
to avoid it. If unable to avoid data exclusivity, countries should limit the 
duration of data exclusivity as well as its scope (e.g., only for new 
chemical entities, and only for undisclosed data). Countries should also 
consider creating exemption mechanisms by which they can exempt 
products from data exclusivity provisions if necessary.336 
Moreover, the CIPIH Report also reaffirms this under Recommendation 4.20, 
which states: 
Developing countries need to decide in the light of their own 
circumstances, what provisions, consistent with the TRIPS agreement, 
would benefit public health, weighing the positive effects against the 
negative effects. A public health justification should be required for data 
protection rules going beyond what is required by the TRIPS agreement. 
There is unlikely to be such a justification in markets with a limited ability 
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to pay and little innovative capacity. Thus, developing countries should 
not impose restrictions for the use of or reliance on such data in ways that 
would exclude fair competition or impede the use of flexibilities built into 
TRIPS.337 
During the surveys in Bangladesh, all but one of the participants argued 
that Bangladesh should not give any test data protection.338 They also stated that 
it would be beneficial to follow the Indian approach so as to allow generic 
competition.339 One participant argued that granting test data protection over 
clinical and pre-clinical trial data could restrict entry of generic medicines as 
local pharmaceutical companies in Bangladesh lacks financial and technical 
resources to conduct original clinical trial.340 However, one MNPC remarked in 
the survey that “test data protection may encourage foreign direct investment 
and technology transfer in Bangladesh.”341 
As an LDC, Bangladesh is still enjoying the Doha waiver for 
pharmaceutical patents; therefore, currently, there is no test-data protection 
system in Bangladesh, and Bangladesh should maintain that position so as to 
help local generic producers. However, Bangladesh should work towards 
creating a patent pool in cooperation with other countries and private 
organizations. 
E. Patent Pool on Country Specific Diseases 
A patent pool is an agreement between two or more patent owners to 
license one or more of their patents to one another or third parties, whether they 
are transferred directly by the patentee to license or through any medium, such 
as a joint venture, set up specifically to administer the patent pool.342 Therefore, 
a patent pool is a mechanism through which various patents held by different 
entities such as companies, universities, and research institutions are made 
available to others for production or further development.343 The patent holders 
receive royalties for the use of the patent not from the user directly, but from the 
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pool management.344 Patent pools are increasingly seen as a useful tool in 
tackling barriers to access to medicines in developing countries through the 
sharing of knowledge and technologies.345 
The rationale for creating a patent pool is that it helps to lower the price 
of pharmaceuticals, and it enhances innovation by considering particular local 
health needs.346 Further, “[a] patent pool that licenses patents in several countries 
can ensure that generic manufacturers operate in efficient economies of scale” 
and can ensure enhanced capacity to manage legal issues as the multitude of 
patents, potential claims of infringement, variance of national laws, complexity 
of international treaties and national patent laws and “complicated rules for the 
export of medical technologies under compulsory licenses present barriers for 
the expanded use of generic medicines.”347 Patent-pool managers “have the 
expertise and capacity to manage issues that arise on behalf of governments, 
donors, public health agencies, patent owners and generic manufacturers.”348 It 
is also worth noting that collective management of the patent pool “will help 
[establish] global ‘best practice’ norms for licensing on such issues as quality 
control, remuneration, open competition, etc.”349 
The World Health Assembly of the WHO discussed patent pools back in 
2008 and later in the Consultative Expert Working Group Report, and 
considered it a feasible mechanism to accelerate the availability of low-cost 
newer medicines in developing countries.350 However, the possibility of creating 
a medicines patent pool (MPP) was first proposed to UNITAID in 2006 by 
Knowledge Ecology International (KEI) and Médecins Sans Frontières, 
following a proposal by KEI at the International AIDS Conference in 2002.351 
Then UNITAID played an instrumental role in the creation of the MPP and 
decided to explore the possibility of establishing a MPP in July 2008. Finally, 
UNITAID decided in December 2009 to create and fund a patent pool focusing 
on increasing access to HIV medicines in developing countries, which became a 
reality in July 2010. It has also been endorsed by the WHO, the U.N. High Level 
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Meeting on AIDS, and the Group of 8 as a promising approach to improve 
access to HIV medicines. 
The MPP negotiates with the patent holders to license to the MPP.352 This 
means that the patent holder allows other producers to manufacture and sell low-
cost, quality versions of the patented medicine in developing countries, or 
develop adapted formulations under certain terms and conditions. The MPP 
seeks licenses that push the status quo in the direction of greater access to 
medicines—covering more countries and containing public-health oriented 
terms and conditions—with the ultimate aim of ensuring all people living with 
HIV in developing countries can access the treatment they need at affordable 
prices. 
Once the license is signed with the original patent holder, the MPP 
proceeds to make sub-licenses with the low cost generic manufacturers and 
other entities. The manufacturer is then free to develop, produce and sell the 
medicine in the agreed countries under strict quality assurance. It is stated that 
“[t]he MPP will particularly ease the development and production of fixed-dose 
combination drugs (FDCs) that have proven to simplify treatment for people 
living with HIV and facilitate treatment scale-up in developing countries, and 
medicines suited for the specific needs of children.”353 In this way, more people 
can be treated with the same amount of money, which is crucial in a climate of 
increasing needs and funding challenges. “Patent holders can get a small royalty 
on the sales of the medicines, and people living with HIV get access to 
affordable, adapted treatment they need at prices they can afford.”354 Figure 1 
depicts the working procedure of MPP. 
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Figure 1 Working Procedure of MPP355 
In analyzing the importance of the MPP, it was remarked in the 
Huffington Post: 
As of today, the history of the MPP is still being written. It will be 
important to see over the coming year whether this patent pool will 
become large enough to effectively accelerate the production of low-cost 
generic versions of new AIDS drugs and the creation of the fixed-dose 
combination. Millions of patients in countries around the world will be 
affected by what happens.356 
Bangladesh could consider a patent-pool structure for prevalent diseases 
in Bangladesh jointly in consultation with other countries having necessity of 
such pharmaceuticals. This could be accomplished by using Articles 66.2357 and 
67358 of the TRIPS Agreement to seek technical and financial cooperation from 
developed countries for developing a patent pool for the specific prevalent 
diseases in Bangladesh. During the surveys, none of the pharmaceutical 
companies expressed any interest in the patent pool. However, during the 
interview some participants argued that this option may be useful for 
  
 355 How It Works, MEDICINES PATENT POOL, http://www.medicinespatentpool.org/wp-
content/uploads/how-it-works-diagram.png (last visited Mar. 24, 2014). 
 356 deFerranti, supra note 350. 
 357 Article 66.2 of the TRIPS Agreement provides that “Developed country Members 
shall provide incentives to enterprises and institutions in their territories for the purpose 
of promoting and encouraging technology transfer to least-developed country Members 
in order to enable them to create a sound and viable technological base.” TRIPS 
Agreement, supra note 2, art. 66.2. “This article puts an obligation on developed Member 
countries to provide incentives to enterprises and institutions. However, the precise 
nature of the incentives is not established; only their end is spelled out: to enable LDC 
members ‘to create a sound and viable technological base.’” Carlos Correa, Intellectual 
Property in LDCs: Strategies for Enhancing Technology Transfer and Dissemination 3, 
18 (UNCTAD The Least Developed Countries Report 2007, Background Paper No. 4, 
2007), available at http://unctad.org/Sections/ldc_dir/docs/ldcr2007_Correa_en.pdf. 
 358 “Article 67 of the TRIPS Agreement sets out developed countries’ commitments on 
technical cooperation. This Article provides that developed country members must 
provide, on request and on mutually agreed terms and conditions, technical and financial 
cooperation in favour of developing and least-developed country members to facilitate 
TRIPs implementation. Such assistance can include assistance in drafting laws and 
regulations to protect IPRs as well as the establishment or reinforcement of domestic 
enforcement agencies.” Farhana Yamin, Globalisation and the International Governance 
of Modern Biotechnology: IPRs, Biotechnology and Food Security, Foundation for 
International Environmental Law and Development 25, available at 
http://www.sristi.org/mdpipr2004/other_readings/OR%2042.pdf. 
Globalizing Standard of Patent Protection in WTO Law and Policy 





Bangladesh to gain technological and financial assistance from developed 
countries on country-specific diseases.359 
Further, Bangladesh should also avoid entering any agreements that limit 
flexibilities allowed under the TRIPS Agreement or that could impose any 
TRIPS-plus obligations. 
F. Not to Agree on Any BITs or FTAs Eroding TRIPS Flexibilities or Imposing 
TRIPS-Plus Obligations 
The ability of LDCs like Bangladesh to utilize the flexibilities of the 
TRIPS Agreement “is being slowly eroded away through various bilateral and 
regional negotiations with developed countries.”360 High-income and 
industrialized countries—more particularly the United States and the European 
Union—put pressure on developing countries and LDCs to introduce TRIPS-
plus provisions, e.g., commitments beyond those specified by TRIPS and those 
providing more extensive protection than TRIPS.361 “TRIPS-plus provisions are 
introduced through bilateral agreements, such as free trade agreements (FTAs) 
and investment treaties.”362 Between 2001 and 2010, “72 FTAs with intellectual 
property clauses have been announced to the WTO. Of specific concern are the 
FTAs between developed countries and markets, most notably the United States 
and the European Union with low and middle income countries” because 
extensive patent provision in the FTAs restricts utilization of TRIPS flexibilities 
and hence present barriers to access of essential pharmaceuticals.363 More 
recently serious concerns have been raised regarding The Trans-Pacific 
Partnership Agreement (TPP)364 and Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 
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(ACTA)365 due to the inclusion of TRIPS-plus patent provisions which may have 
serious impacts on public health. LDCs like Bangladesh should be aware of the 
various TRIPS-plus provisions that can have a negative impact on the use of 
TRIPS Agreement flexibilities and subsequently on access to affordable 
medicines. Below are some of the most common TRIPS-plus provisions related 
to public health and access to medicines: 
• Waiving the LDC exception as allowed under the TRIPS agreement366 
• Defining “innovation” for the purposes of determining patent protection 
to include minor “me-too” molecular variations 
• Restricting patent oppositions 
• Extending patent terms beyond 20 years for delayed marketing approval 
• Limiting parallel imports of patented drugs 
• Restricting grounds for compulsory licensing 
• Imposing “data exclusivity” rules 
• Linking patent systems to drug regulatory systems367 
These TRIPS-plus provisions, if adopted by any developing countries and 
LDCs, will outweigh the benefits of the TRIPS flexibilities for the country 
concerned and will have severe consequences on access to medicines.368 The 
pressure to adopt more extensive protection than required by the TRIPS 
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Agreement has also led to the debate over the floor versus ceiling in an 
international IP regime. 
Annette Kur and Henning Grosse Ruse-Khan argue that advancing the 
concept of a ceiling for the TRIPS Agreement would protect flexibilities under 
the TRIPS Agreement from encroachment by “IP maximalists.”369 
[T]he concept of maximum rights or ‘ceiling rules’ which provide for a 
binding maximum amount of IP protection that WTO Members can offer 
in their national laws . . .[to] maintain a balanced approach towards IP 
protection, and to protect members states’ autonomy in preserving public 
policy goals vis-à-vis pressure exerted against them in bilateral trade 
negotiations.370 
According to them, TRIPS Art. 1:1 provides that: 
[M]ore extensive protection may only be granted “provided that such 
protection does not contravene the provisions of this Agreement.” In spite 
of that, the general perception in international IP regulation so far has been 
that above the prescribed minimum standards there is no ceiling or limit 
other than the sky.371 
On the other hand, J.H. Reichman stated that with the mandates, the 
TRIPS Agreement established a floor for global IP norms.372 Reichman contends 
that “states must accord to the nationals of other member states those 
international minimum standards of intellectual property protection that are 
comprised within ‘the treatment provided for in this Agreement.’”373 The U.S. 
government and its industry lobbyists argue that the TRIPS Agreement should 
not only be preserved as the “floor” for global standards, but that more attempts 
need to be taken to strengthen the TRIPS Agreement and other agreements to 
upgrade legal systems and enforcement mechanisms in the field of IP.374 
To date, there is no debate at the WTO or other international bodies 
regarding the introduction of ceiling or maximum protection restriction or any 
proposal in support of it from the developing countries or the LDCs. In the 
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absence of any maximum limit, a country could frame its IP law based on its 
comparative advantage in a specific (R&D-based) area of innovation or 
imitation. Additionally, considering the importance of other societal values and 
public goods beyond those of commercial interest as well as the country’s stage 
of development, LDCs and developing countries may need distinct types of 
ceilings. Any international binding regime on the ceiling, at least if placed 
within the WTO, could potentially open the door for further complex legal 
disputes under the WTO dispute settlement body and could further jeopardize 
the process of ongoing policy space for access to medicines and other 
developmental goals in the LDCs. 
Therefore, LDCs such as Bangladesh need not adopt any ceiling on IPRs 
at the national level, but instead can keep the space open to strengthen IPRs in 
future if local industry matures and engages in innovation. Rather, Bangladesh 
should try to avoid any TRIPS-plus obligations in free trade and investment 
agreements with the United States, the European Union, or with any other 
developed countries, and it may need to be aware of and try to mitigate TRIPS-
plus obligations in various bilateral and regional free trade or investment 
agreements.375 While avoiding TRIPS-plus obligations will allow LDCs like 
Bangladesh the freedom to utilize TRIPS flexibilities, LDCs including 
Bangladesh could also lobby for further extension of the TRIPS waiver periods 
in general and with pharmaceutical patent waivers in particular. 
G. Lobby for the Extension of the Transition Period for Pharmaceutical Patents 
Considering the vulnerable condition of LDCs due to their socioeconomic 
conditions and weak public-health infrastructures, the introduction of 
pharmaceutical patents will make LDCs more marginalized in terms of coping 
with the prevailing situation. Bangladesh, in cooperation with other LDCs, 
should consider lobbying for further extension of the transitional period for 
pharmaceutical patents beyond 2016 (now beyond 2021 after the new extension 
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decision on June 2013) so that it will have more time to develop its 
infrastructure and its local pharmaceutical industry to deal with public-health 
problems in a post-TRIPS setting. The Prime Minster of Bangladesh has argued 
that it is necessary for LDCs like Bangladesh to receive another fifteen-year 
extension based upon their weak infrastructure, vulnerable health conditions, 
and the nascent stage of their pharmaceutical industries.376 During her 
deliberation to the Sixty-fourth World Health Assembly (May 17, 2011), the 
Prime Minister of Bangladesh, Sheikh Hasina, reiterated that the flexibilities 
accorded within the existing IP regime, in particular the patent waiver for LDCs 
for pharmaceuticals, must be extended further.377 
In this respect, Bangladesh could argue that the socioeconomic situation, 
low level of development, and health and technical infrastructure for which the 
transitional period was granted are still prevalent in LDCs; therefore, the 
graduation to a pharmaceutical patent regime will have a huge negative impact 
on Bangladesh.378 Unless there is considerable progress in the social and 
economic development of the LDCs, growth of health infrastructure, and an 
increase in the accessibility and availability of medicines, Bangladesh should 
argue for the continuation of the waiver for pharmaceutical patents under the 
principle of special and differential treatment for the derogation from 
commitment.379 
  
 376 Sheikh Hasina, Prime Minister of Bangladesh, Speech to the Sixty-fourth World 
Health Assembly (May 17, 2011), (transcript available at 
http://www.who.int/mediacentre/events/2011/wha64/sheikh_hasina_speech_20110517/en
/index.html). 
 377 Id. 
 378 To continue the transitional period until graduation to a higher level of social and 
economic development and, hence,an ideal situation for the introduction of 
pharmaceutical patents case by case or under a country-driven approach with recourse to 
the WTO, Special and Differential Treatment may be sought. See Thomas Cottier, From 
Progressive Liberalization to Progressive Regulation in WTO Law, 9 J. INT’L ECON. L. 
779, 414–19 (2006). 
 379 Special and differential treatment (S&D) is a set of GATT provisions (GATT 1947, 
Article XVIII) that exempts developing countries from the same strict trade rules and 
disciplines of more industrialized countries. For example, in the Uruguay Round 
Agreement on Agriculture, LDCs are exempt from any reduction commitments and 
developing countries are given longer time periods to phase in export subsidy and tariff 
reductions than the more industrialized countries. Using this principle, exemption from 
introducing pharmaceutical patents may also be extended as long as problems of access 
to pharmaceuticals and a low level of social and economic development persists in the 
particular developing countries and LDCs. See, e.g., Javier Lopez Gonzalez et al., TRIPS 
and Special & Differential Treatment – Revisiting the Case for Derogations in Applying 
Patent Protection for Pharmaceuticals in Developing Countries 17–34 (NCCR Trade 








On November 11, 2011, on behalf of the LDC group, the delegation of 
Bangladesh to the WTO submitted to the TRIPS Council an elements paper on 
the extension of the TRIPS transition period for LDCs, which mentioned that 
LDCs are facing serious economic, financial, and administrative constraints on 
their efforts to bring their domestic legal systems into conformity with the 
TRIPS Agreement.380 This request was made to extend the transitional period for 
implementing the TRIPS Agreement, which was scheduled to expire on July 1, 
2013.  
Accordingly, the TRIPS Council decision on June 11, 2013 extended not 
only general TRIPS obligations but also obligations to introduce TRIPS 
pharmaceutical patents until July 1, 2021. However, LDC members of the WTO 
could make separate requests to extend the pharmaceutical patent waiver even 
further. Ellen ‘t Hoen, former director of the Medicines Patent Pool and former 
head of the Médicins Sans Frontières’ Campaign for Access to Essential 
Medicines, remarked that: 
LDCs [could] also ask for an extension for pharmaceuticals and data 
protection closer to the 2016 deadline, they could ask for a longer 
deadline than 2021 for pharmaceuticals, for example, until they have 
‘graduated’ to developing country status, which is what they tried to do 
for the entire TRIPS agreement.381 
Most of the survey participants in Bangladesh argued that the government 
of Bangladesh along with other LDCs should lobby for a further extension for 
pharmaceutical patents until 2030 or until graduation from LDC category by a 
particular LDC.382 The MNPCs that participated in the surveys argued that a 
further extension of the waiver for pharmaceutical patents will not benefit 
Bangladesh and, rather, will hamper the technological development and further 
investment in the sector.383 In contrast, during the interview, one participant 
argued that the local pharmaceutical sector in Bangladesh has yet to have 
  
 380 WTO COUNCIL FOR TRIPS, ELEMENTS PAPER ON THE EXTENSION OF THE 
TRANSITION PERIOD UNDER ARTICLE 66.1 OF THE TRIPS AGREEMENT, IP/C/W/566 (Nov. 





 381 Catherine Saez, What Does WTO Extension For LDCs To Enforce IP Mean For 
Pharmaceuticals?, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY WATCH (Aug. 2, 2013, 11:45 AM), 
http://www.ip-watch.org/2013/08/02/what-does-wto-extension-for-ldcs-to-enforce-ip-
mean-for-pharmaceuticals/ (emphasis added) (quoting Ellen ‘t Hoen). 
 382 This position was supported by all the large, medium, and small local 
pharmaceutical companies in Bangladesh that participated in the survey. 
 383 During the survey, this position was supported by all the MNPCs operating in 
Bangladesh. 
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enough R&D to compete with the MNPCs; therefore, further extension will help 
them to engage in R&D and prepare themselves for a transition to a 
pharmaceutical patent regime.384 Further, one expert in the DPDT of Bangladesh 
commented that considering technical and infrastructural limitations in the 
DPDT, it would be better to have a transition period until 2030 for the 
introduction of pharmaceutical patents.385 Therefore, Bangladesh should lobby 
for a further extension of pharmaceutical patents considering its present stage of 
technological capability and infrastructural development. 
However, a simple extension of transitional periods without any concrete 
steps to promote the advancement of the pharmaceutical industry would be 
useless. Therefore, LDCs such as Bangladesh should use the transitional periods 
as part of a national strategy aimed at encouraging pharmaceutical production 
and investment in R&D based industry for progression towards innovation and 
TRIPS compliance. One such strategy is to introduce process patent and utility 
model law to encourage weak- or low-level national innovation and, 
consequently, promote technological learning and progression on basic research. 
H. Provision for Process Patent During Transitional Period and Adoption of a 
Utility Model Law 
Before adoption of the TRIPS Agreement, many countries provided only 
process—but not product—patents because process patents would still allow for 
the manufacture of patented products using a different process or method. This 
has particularly enabled manufacturers in certain countries such as India to make 
and become global suppliers of generic versions of patented.386 
Despite having a long tradition of drug manufacturing, India’s then 
applicable patent law (Patent Act of 1911) placed constraints on India’s ability 
to use the full potential of its local industry. By introducing only process patents 
along with other supporting industrial policies, India was able to dislodge the 
MNPCs from their position of dominance and turn India into a major 
pharmaceutical-producing nation. As stated by Sudip Chaudhuri: 
A number of factors have contributed to the emergence of India as a major 
pharmaceutical producing nation. Among these are: 
 A tradition of development of process-technology by indigenous 
enterprises;  
 the externalities associated with the setting up of two major 
public enterprises;  
 the close association between manufacturers and government 
laboratories; and  
  
 384 Interview with an expert at the Directorate of Drug Administration in Bangladesh, 
in Dhaka, Bangl. (Jan. 12, 2012). 
 385 Interview with a deputy registrar at the Department of Patents, Designs and 
Trademarks, in Dhaka, Bangl. (Jan. 22, 2012). 
 386 See World Health Org., supra note 98, at 238. 
 




 the patent and industrial policies since the 1970s387 
Because Bangladesh still follows the Patent Act of 1911 (which was 
followed by India until 1970) the country should follow India’s footsteps by 
introducing process patents and encouraging the local pharmaceutical industry 
to invest in R&D. They could also work in cooperation with local research 
institutions and Universities. 
In addition to process patents, the government of Bangladesh could 
introduce a utility model law. This could play a very important role in promoting 
inventive and innovative activity not only in the pharmaceutical sector but also 
emerging local industries in the fields of information technology, textile 
manufacturing, telecommunications, and biotechnology. In Bangladesh, there 
are many small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) including some 
pharmaceutical companies with inventive ideas; however, they often do not file 
patent applications due to the high cost of acquiring a patent, bureaucratic 
hurdles, long delays in acquiring a patent, and lack of confidence in their ability 
to satisfy high patentability requirements.  
However, surveys show most of the local pharmaceutical companies 
believe that a simple system that could grant protection quickly would help them 
to quickly grow and further innovate.388 Again, bureaucratic delays and 
expensive filings can be avoided if a simple system can be put into place. Such a 
system with a broad scope could help in overcoming the lack of incentives for 
inventions excluded from patent protection.389 It is important to require relative 
novelty as opposed to absolute novelty for a utility model and also decrease the 
amount of time it takes to review and grant patents, possibly five years. 
Adopting relative novelty will ensure that the innovators get utility model 
protection quickly by way of simple examination even if the patent application 
contains only weak innovation—such as if there is at least one difference 
between the invention and the prior art. 
Therefore, a utility model law along with the introduction of process 
patents should play an important role in filling the gap in law for promoting 
local, albeit weak inventions while also encouraging them to further research 
and innovation. However, it would be better for Bangladesh to introduce process 
patents under the existing patent law and adopt a separate law on utility models 
to encourage local innovation as local industries have yet to attain adequate 
  
 387 SUDIP CHAUDHURI, THE WTO AND INDIA’S PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY 20 (2005). 
See generally Sudip Chaudhuri, TRIPS and Changes in Pharmaceutical Patent Regime in 
India (Indian Institute of Management 25–30 (Calcutta, Working Paper No 535, Jan. 
2005), available at http://cdrwww.who.int/hiv/amds/IDA_India-Patent-amendments-
Sudip.pdf. 
 388 Based on the survey data of local large, medium, and small pharmaceutical 
companies in Bangladesh. However, MNPCs made no comments on this. 
 389 See UMA SUTHERSANEN, UTILITY MODELS AND INNOVATION IN DEVELOPING 
COUNTRIES 5–7 (Feb. 2006), available at http://unctad.org/en/Docs/iteipc20066_en.pdf. 
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technical capacities and lack financial resources for basic research and, hence, 
for product patents as well. In addition to the process patent and utility model, 
the government of Bangladesh could also consider introducing special 
investment protection measures for the pharmaceutical industry to promote 
further investment, joint venture, technology transfer, and basic research in the 
pharmaceutical sector of Bangladesh. 
I. Special Investment Protection Regime, Open Drug Innovation Model and 
Promotion of “Social Businessˮ Model in the Pharmaceutical Sector 
“There is a lack of new medicines for the ‘neglected diseases’—those that 
primarily affect populations with little purchasing power, and therefore offer an 
insufficient incentive for industry to invest in R&D.”390 That is why developing 
countries and LDCs should devise a special investment regime to encourage 
investment in research related to country-specific neglected diseases and also 
could encourage local research institutions to join an open drug innovation 
model in the absence of huge financial resources for basic research.Shamnad 
Basheer proposed a comprehensive investment-protection regime based on the 
compensatory liability model, which will grant comprehensive market 
exclusivity for new drugs against free riders until such time as the investment in 
the discovery and development of that drug is recouped and considering that it 
could be more preferable to a patent regime.391 He further recommended a 
reimbursement model, in which the costs of drug discovery and development 
can be reimbursed through public funding and prizes.392 Unlike patents and data 
exclusivity for uniform periods of protection, the proposed regime will reward a 
rate of return on investment dependent inter alia on the health value of the 
drug.393 
However, Basheer stated that his proposed investment protection regime 
is better suited to fostering cures for developed country diseases prevalent in the 
United States and the European Union.394 Considering the huge cost for basic 
research and drug development and minimal financial resources of consumers in 
LDCs like Bangladesh, this kind of investment regime could be of little help to 
generate investment in the LDC-specific diseases. 
  
 390 Suerie Moon et al., Innovation and Access to Medicines for Neglected Populations: 
Could a Treaty Address a Broken Pharmaceutical R&D System?, 9 PLOS MED 1, 1 
(2012). 
 391 See Shamnad Basheer, The Invention of an Investment Incentive for 
Pharmaceutical Innovation, 15 J. WORLD INTELL. PROP. 305, 305 (2012), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Delivery.cfm/SSRN_ID2203440_code339749.pdf?abstractid
=2203440&mirid=1. 
 392 Id. at 46–48.  
 393 Id. 
 394 Id. at 309. 
 




Most of the developing countries and LDCs such as Bangladesh have 
clearly different pharmaceutical demands than developed countries. “The 
diseases of the poor attract very little R&D efforts by the large pharmaceutical 
industry, since they are not promising income generators. R&D is driven by 
market considerations. R&D targeting diseases found in developing countries is 
marginal.”395 
Despite the lack of patent protection for pharmaceuticals in Bangladesh 
until the patent waiver periods for LDCs expire, the government of Bangladesh 
could introduce a special investment-protection regime to encourage investment 
and technology transfer in the pharmaceutical sector by providing “exclusive 
marketing rights” for the same duration as patent. The government also could 
provide tax incentives for a certain period of time. In this regard, Bangladesh 
could set two preconditions for getting special investment protection: first, 
investment and/or technology transfer in an area of neglected diseases or 
diseases prevalent in Bangladesh and second, any drugs produced under the 
investment or by way of technology transfer, if intended to offer in the local 
market must satisfy requirements for licensing and market authorization by the 
DGDA in Bangladesh.396 
The government of Bangladesh could also encourage local research 
institutions and pharmaceutical companies to engage themselves in the 
development of a new open source drug innovation model and to participate in 
  
 395 Carlos Correa, TRIPS and R&D Incentives in the Pharmaceutical Sector 19 
(Comm’n on Macroeconomics and Health, Working Paper No.WG2:11, Nov. 2011), 
available at http://library.cphs.chula.ac.th/Ebooks/HealthCareFinancing/Working 
Paper_WG2/WG2_11.pdf. 
 396 See generally WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, GLOBALIZATION AND ACCESS TO 
DRUGS, HEALTH ECONOMICS AND DRUG SERIES 007 (Jan. 1999), available at 
http://apps.who.int/medicinedocs/pdf/whozip35e/whozip35e.pdf. 
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existing open source drug discovery models.397 Open source drug discovery 
models are based on the idea that sharing medical information and international 
collaboration among scientists will advance medical research and, ultimately, 
will help patients all over the world suffering from neglected diseases.398 As an 
example, Bangladesh could follow the Indian Open Source Drug Discovery 
(OSDD) project to encourage research on the prevalent diseases in Bangladesh. 
The Indian OSDD project is a collaborative online platform where contributors 
can collectively discover new therapies for neglected diseases, which initially 
focused on tuberculosis (TB) research. It was started in 2008 based on the $12 
million in funding provided by the Indian Government along with a commitment 
to invest $35 million total towards the project. Therefore, the government of 
Bangladesh could provide some initial funding and encourage local research 
institutions and pharmaceutical companies to form collaborative drug innovation 
projects on country-specific diseases and later seek financial and technical 
cooperation from international organizations such as WHO, UNIDO, MNPCs, 
and transnational research institutions and funding from philanthropic 
organizations such as the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation. Other open source 
initiatives in the pharmaceutical sector such as the Tropical Diseases 
  
 397 Open source “is a way of sharing data, expertise, and resources to increase 
collaboration, transparency, and cumulative public knowledge. It has been used in the 
software field since its infancy half a century ago, and tried in the bio-pharma field over 
the last decade.” HASSAN MASUM & RACHELLE HARRIS, OPEN SOURCE FOR NEGLECTED 
DISEASES: CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES, CENTER FOR GLOBAL HEALTH R&D POLICY 
ASSESSMENT 3 (Feb. 22, 2011), available at 
http://healthresearchpolicy.org/sites/healthresearchpolicy.org/files/assessments/files/OS_f
or_NTDs_Consultation%20Draft.pdf. Additionally, a number of open source initiatives 
have started in the medical field such as India’s Council of Scientific and Industrial 
Research, which is working on open source drug discovery to develop drugs for the 
treatment of drug-resistant tuberculosis. See COUNCIL OF SCIENTIFIC AND INDUS. 




HeI7eLQEjp046ICqlgNqcKtQ&sig2=HSlB_lx2j3rZ60LDaCSxNw. “In the long run, it 
may help minimize duplication of effort, and create a ‘commons’ of knowledge and data 
from which future innovation can grow.” MASUM & HARRIS, supra note 397, at 3. 
 398 See Stephen M. Maurer et al., Finding Cures for Tropical Diseases: Is Open 
Source an Answer?, 1 PLOS MED. 183 (2004). 
 




Initiative,399 TDR Targets,400 Collaborative Drug Discovery401 and The Lilly TB 
Drug Discovery Initiative402 could also be examined by LDCs to gain an 
understanding of their working procedures and then used to develop more 
effective open source drug innovation projects targeting the health needs of the 
LDCs. 
Furthermore, LDCs such as Bangladesh could devise a different strategy 
to encourage multinationals to invest in Bangladesh’s pharmaceutical sector 
under the “social business model”403 as part of their social corporate 
responsibility and humanitarian goals to help ensure that newly patented drugs 
that are necessary but not produced by the Bangladeshi pharmaceutical 
companies are available at affordable prices. This could be done either in 
cooperation with local research institutions or through a joint venture with local 
  
 399 “The Tropical Diseases Initiative (TDI) modeled itself explicitly on open source 
approaches as early as 2004 and produced a set of potential drug targets from pathogen 
genomes that have been released under a Creative Commons license for further work.” 
Hassan Masum & Rachelle Harris, Open Source for Neglected Diseases: Magic Bullet or 
Mirage?, RESULTS FOR DEVELOPMENT INSTITUTE 7 (2011), available at 
http://r4d.org/sites/resultsfordevelopment.org/files/Open%20Source%20for%20Neglecte
d%20Diseases.pdf. 
 400 “TDR Targets is a WHO/TDR database that facilitates prioritization of potential 
drug targets across tropical disease areas.” Id. It “brings together information on 
genomics, structural data, inhibitors and targets, and druggability.” Id. 
 401 Collaborative Drug Discovery is a California-based company, which “has created a 
platform for selective sharing of collaborative drug discovery data.” Id. at 6. “It allows 
preclinical biological and chemical drug discovery data to be securely stored, shared, 
analyzed, and collaborated upon through a web interface.” Id. 
 402 The Lilly TB Drug Discovery Initiative is a not-for-profit public-private 
partnership headquartered in Seattle, Washington, with a mission to accelerate early-stage 
drug discovery and help identify the tuberculosis drugs of the future. It has opened access 
to its drug discovery expertise and scientific resources—such as its proprietary library of 
500,000 compounds and innovative chemistry research tools—to be applied to the search 
for new drugs to fight tuberculosis. See About the Initiative, THE LILLY TB DRUG 
DISCOVERY INITIATIVE, http://www.tbdrugdiscovery.org/aboutinitiative.html (last visited 
Mar. 17, 2014). 
 403 A social business is a non-loss, non-dividend company designed to address a social 
objective. MUHAMMAD YUNUS, BUILDING SOCIAL BUSINESS: THE NEW KIND OF 
CAPITALISM THAT SERVES HUMANITY’S MOST PRESSING NEEDS 1 (2010). In this type of 
business organization, profits are used in a manner in which they may expand the 
company’s reach and improve the product or service to a greater extent than a traditional 
for-profit corporation, which is the reason why the investors receive no dividends or extra 
payments apart from their initial investment. See MUHAMMAD YUNUS, CREATING A 
WORLD WITHOUT POVERTY: SOCIAL BUSINESS AND THE FUTURE OF CAPITALISM 23–25 
(2007). The main organizations promoting and incubating social businesses are the 
Yunus Centre in Bangladesh and the Grameen Creative Lab in Germany. See 
MUHAMMAD YUNUS, BUILDING SOCIAL BUSINESS: THE NEW KIND OF CAPITALISM THAT 
SERVES HUMANITY’S MOST PRESSING NEEDS 154–58 (2010). 
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pharmaceutical companies. The government of Bangladesh could provide 
“special exclusive marketing rights” for pharmaceuticals produced under a 
social business regime for a certain period of time in consultation with DGDA 
and prospective investors. In deciding to grant this exclusivity, LDCs can 
consider factors such as the nature of the investment, the necessity of the 
medication, and the local demand, and the exclusivity can be conditioned on the 
requirement that they maintain an adequate supply of the drug at an affordable 
price. 
CONCLUSION 
This Article examined the possible options for legislative changes and 
governmental interventions in developing countries and LDCs such as 
Bangladesh in comparison to the options used in Brazil, India, and South Africa, 
and it explained some of the drawbacks and limitations of existing patent laws. 
Considering the limitations of patent law, this Article explored possible 
governmental intervention options such as drug price control, national 
competition law, patent prizes, patent pools, process utility patents, investment 
protection regimes, and social business models that can be used to facilitate 
access to medicines.  
This Article, among others, also explored the option of lobbying to extend 
the transitional periods for the introduction of pharmaceutical patents and 
recommended that developing countries and LDCs reject BITS/FTAs that 
contain TRIPS-plus provisions that result in the erosion of TRIPS flexibilities. 
However, a country cannot gain substantial benefits from the extended 
transitional periods or TRIPS flexibilities unless it has attained a certain level of 
technological capacity and has developed a strong generic pharmaceutical 
industry.404 Even a compulsory licensing mechanism will be of little use without 
the technological capability to produce generic pharmaceuticals and a well-
developed local pharmaceutical industry.405 Hence, the creation of sound 
competitive market structures through competition law and enforcement could 
be more effective in enhancing both access to medical technology and fostering 
innovation in the pharmaceutical sector.406 It can serve as a corrective tool if 
IPRs hinder competition and create a potential barrier to innovation and 
access.407 Again, while adopting a TRIPS-compliant patent law, LDCs need to 
  
 404 See Bryan Mercurio, Resolving the Public Health Crisis in the Developing World: 
Problems and Barriers of Access to Essential Medicines, 5 NW. U. J. INT’L HUM. RTS. 1, 
40 (2006). 
 405 Id. 
 406 WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, PROMOTING ACCESS TO MEDICAL TECHNOLOGIES 
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AND TRADE 53 (2012), available at 
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ensure that their IP protection regimes do not run counter to their public health 
policies and that they are consistent with and supportive of such policies. 
